區塊鏈網路最初被設計為無需信任的系統，礦工與驗證者本應擔任中立的交易排序仲裁者，主要透過區塊補貼與手續費獲得報酬，以維護網路安全。這項中立原則隨著最大可提取價值（MEV）的出現被根本性改變，重塑了支撐去中心化生態的激勵機制。
MEV 帶來了區塊鏈經濟的典範轉移，使驗證者從被動的交易處理者，變成積極策略操控交易順序以榨取額外利潤的金融角色。根據 Flashbots 的研究，自 2020 年以來僅以太坊的 MEV 暗黑經濟規模就已超過 6.75 億美元，預計隨著 DeFi 普及，每年提取金額恐突破數十億。
MEV 一詞最初在以太坊 PoW 時代被稱為“礦工可提取價值”，指礦工可藉由刻意重排、插入或審查區塊內的交易來賺取額外利潤。以太坊於 2022 年 9 月進入 PoS 機制後，MEV 定義擴展為“最大可提取價值”，代表驗證者及專業“搜尋者”可利用生態中交易依賴關係，開拓更多獲利機會。
此轉變對區塊鏈的中立性承諾產生根本性影響。區塊產生從過去著重技術與安全，演進為高階金融工程競賽，參與者透過先進演算法、高效運算設施與市場分析，把握短暫仲裁、清算與協議漏洞機會。如伊利諾大學研究員 Ari Juels 在 2019 年首度定義 MEV 的論文中指出：“以公平開放為目標的加密貨幣，須正視參與者改變交易處理順序謀利的內在動機。”
MEV 與 DeFi 自 2020 年起的蓬勃發展息息相關。借貸平台、去中心化交易所及衍生品協定複雜的智能合約交互，為策略性交易排序創造了豐富的價值提取空間。這現象對區塊鏈“民主取用”承諾提出根本疑問，因為資源雄厚的 MEV 參與者藉由技術與資本優勢遠遠領先一般用戶。
理解 MEV 機制：從概念到執行
MEV 利用本質來自於區塊鏈非原子性的交易處理。與傳統金融市場即時結算不同，區塊鏈交易需先進入待處理記憶池（mempool），再由驗證者挑選排序進入區塊。此流程在以太坊約需 12 秒（其他鏈則略有不同），創造了可被利用的資訊不對稱及排序機會。
驗證者因此從被動處理者變為可透過下列方式主動獲利的市場參與者：
交易排序策略
最直接的 MEV 策略為調整交易排序以圖利自己。例如當記憶池中出現可能大幅拉動價格的大額交易時，驗證者可選擇在該交易前插入自己的交易（搶先交易/front-running）、之後插入（追後交易/back-running）或前後夾擊（三明治攻擊）。MEV-Explore 等數據服務指出，這類排序手法約佔所有發現的 MEV 行為七成。
具體案例如：2023 年 7 月，有人試圖在 Uniswap 購買價值 50 萬美元的 GMX 代幣時，被 MEV 機器人發現並發動三明治攻擊。該機器人先購入 15 萬美元 GMX 拉高價格，待該交易執行後再賣出，單筆賺取 7,500 美元，導致原交易者多付 1.5%。
仲裁套利機會
不同協議間同一資產價格差為天然的套利空間。MEV 機器人持續監控如 Uniswap、SushiSwap、Curve 等 DEX 價格，於出現暫時落差時快速交易，從中榨取價值，原本這些價值應合理留給普通交易者。
進階套利機器人會運用複雜路由運算，串連多個協議執行一連串交易。例如偵測到 ETH 在 Uniswap 折價於 Balancer，機器人會在 Uniswap 低買、隨即於 Balancer 高賣，全於單一區塊完成，利用原子性排除市場波動風險，達成無風險套利。
Flashbots 數據指出，套利型 MEV 約佔以太坊所有可提取價值的 65-75%，於市場劇烈波動時，每日提取金額常超過 100 萬美元。特別是在市場震盪期間，協議間價格短暫失衡，套利機會最為明顯。
清算機制
如 Aave、Compound、MakerDAO 等借貸協議，為確保資產安全，當借款人的抵押品低於門檻時即觸發清算機會。專業 MEV 清算機器人競相執行清算，以獲得 5-10% 的清算手續費。
例如：2023 年 3 月 USDC 脫鉤事件期間，MEV 機器人於數小時內清算逾 2.5 億美元頭寸，賺進約 1,500 萬美元清算獎勵。當時因爭奪清算權，交易費用飆升至 200 gwei（平時約 30 gwei），顯示驗證者優先處理這類高價值交易。
2023 年 5 月具體案例：Aave 上一名借款人以 100 ETH（當時約 18 萬美元）抵押借入 12 萬 USDC。ETH 跌破 1,800 美元後觸發清算，MEV 機器人即時還款 6 萬美元（半數部位）、奪得 50 ETH 抵押品（清算罰金 10%），扣除燃料費約 600 美元後，單筆交易淨賺 5,400 美元。
即時流動性提供（JIT Liquidity）
更進階的 MEV 手法是在大型兌換發生前立即提供流動性，發生後立即撤出，稱為即時流動性。這讓 MEV 提取者抓住高額手續費而不需承擔短暫無常損失，精準捕捉時機，將原本屬於長期流動性提供者的收益轉為己有。
Flashbots 資料顯示，JIT 流動性約佔所有 MEV 提取的 10-15%，以 Uniswap v3 及其他集中流動性協議為主。這項機制技術門檻高，但極度高利，有大型工商協受波動時單日收入破 5 萬美元。
市場影響與 DeFi 動態：效率與公平性的矛盾
MEV 對市場結構的影響，凸顯 DeFi 世界效率與公平之間的根本張力。從流動性到協議治理，MEV 幾乎重塑了 DeFi 的每個面向。
市場效率與流動性影響
MEV 驅動的套利確實促進了 DeFi 協議間的價格效率。當套利機器人迅速填補價格差異時，確保資產在各大去中心化交易所間維持一致估價。區塊鏈分析公司 Chainalysis 指出，主要 DEX 之間的價格差距維持時間，現僅約 15 秒內即被消除（過去 DeFi 剛起步時可長達數分鐘甚至數小時），這直接歸功於 MEV 套利模式。
然而，這種效率對普通用戶來說代價不小。MEV 實際上等同於 DeFi 交易的一項隱形稅，研究估計一般使用者因三明治攻擊與其他抽取策略，損失了 0.5~1% 的交易價值。這對散戶格外不公平，因他們通常缺乏專業技術來利用私有交易通道或先進路由保護自己。
矛盾的是，MEV 既可提升流動性（套利維持場內價格同步，增進資本效率），卻也可能損害流動性——被三明治攻擊威脅的大額交易趨向避免公開記憶池，促使流動性分散於私人交易通道。此一現象加速發展了如 Cowswap 及其他抗 MEV 交易協議，以批次拍賣或鏈下解決方式減低提取風險。
驗證者經濟與
Centralization Pressures
中心化壓力
The emergence of MEV has fundamentally altered the economic incentives for block producers. Prior to MEV awareness, validators primarily earned income from block rewards and transaction fees. Today, MEV extraction constitutes a significant portion of validator economics, with industry data suggesting that top Ethereum validators derive 40-60% of their total revenue from MEV-related activities.
MEV 的出現根本改變了區塊生產者的經濟誘因。在 MEV 概念普及之前，驗證者主要的收入來源是區塊獎勵和交易手續費。如今，MEV 擷取已構成驗證者經濟模型中顯著的一部分，業界資料顯示，頂級以太坊驗證者有 40-60% 的總收入來自與 MEV 相關的活動。
This shift has intensified the competitive landscape for validators, with significant implications for network decentralization. As MEV extraction requires sophisticated technical infrastructure and specialized knowledge, advantages accrue to larger, better-capitalized operators. The resulting specialization has led to increasing concentration in the validator ecosystem, with the top 10 Ethereum validators consistently producing over 85% of blocks containing significant MEV extraction, according to 2023 data from Rated Network.
這一轉變加劇了驗證者之間的競爭，對網路去中心化帶來了重大影響。由於 MEV 擷取需要先進的技術基礎建設和專業知識，優勢集中於規模較大、資本充裕的營運者。這種專業化使得驗證者生態系統日益集中。根據 Rated Network 2023 年的數據，前十大以太坊驗證者持續生產了超過 85% 含有大量 MEV 擷取的區塊。
The economics are compelling: A study by the Ethereum Foundation found that validators with optimized MEV extraction capabilities earn 135% more than validators without such capabilities. This profit differential drives centralization, as smaller validators either join larger pools or exit the ecosystem entirely. The long-term implications for blockchain decentralization remain concerning, with some researchers suggesting that MEV could eventually push most blockchains toward oligopolistic validator structures.
經濟效益十分驚人：以太坊基金會的一項研究發現，擁有優化 MEV 擷取能力的驗證者，其收入比沒有該能力的驗證者高出 135%。這種利潤差異推動了中心化，導致小型驗證者要麼加入大型礦池，要麼完全退出生態系統。對於區塊鏈長期去中心化的影響仍然令人擔憂，有一些研究人員更指出 MEV 最終可能使多數區塊鏈走向寡頭化的驗證者結構。
Protocol Design and Adaptation
協議設計與適應
Protocol designers have been forced to adapt to the reality of MEV, incorporating defensive mechanisms to protect users and maintain protocol integrity. Automated market makers (AMMs) have implemented features like:
協議設計者被迫面對 MEV 的現實，並納入防禦機制來保護用戶及維持協議完整性。自動做市商（AMM）引入了以下機制：
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Slippage Tolerances: Allowing users to specify maximum acceptable price deviations, protecting against sandwich attacks
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Transaction Deadlines: Automatically failing transactions that remain pending for too long, reducing exposure to price manipulation
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Time-Weighted Average Pricing: Executing large orders over multiple blocks to reduce price impact and MEV exposure
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滑點容忍度：允許用戶指定最大可接受的價格偏差，防範三明治攻擊
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交易截止時間：對於等待時間過長而未被確認的交易自動失敗，減少價格操縱風險
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時間加權平均價格：將大量訂單拆分至多個區塊執行，以減輕價格影響並降低 MEV 風險
These adaptations improve user protection but increase protocol complexity and often reduce capital efficiency. The trade-off between MEV resistance and protocol functionality remains a central challenge for DeFi designers. Some protocols have embraced more radical approaches, such as Pendle Finance's use of Merkle tree-based commitments to hide transaction details until execution, effectively eliminating front-running opportunities.
這些調整提升了用戶保護，但同時增加協議複雜度，且通常降低資本效率。提升 MEV 抵禦力與協議功能性的取捨，仍是 DeFi 設計者的核心挑戰。有些協議更採用激進方案，例如 Pendle Finance 利用 Merkle 樹承諾機制，於執行前隱藏交易細節，有效根除搶先交易（front-running）機會。
Lending protocols have similarly evolved, implementing tiered liquidation systems that distribute opportunities more evenly and reduce the winner-takes-all dynamics of traditional liquidation markets. For example, Aave v3 introduced a Dutch auction mechanism for liquidations that gradually increases liquidation bonuses over time, reducing the incentive for gas price wars and potentially decreasing MEV extraction from liquidation events.
借貸協議也有類似進化，實行分級清算系統，使機會分配更平均，減少傳統清算市場贏家通吃的狀態。例如，Aave v3 推出了荷蘭式拍賣清算機制，隨時間遞增清算獎勵，降低了搶氣費（gas war）的誘因，並有望減少清算事件引發的 MEV 擷取。
Technological Arms Race and Ecosystem Responses
技術軍備競賽與生態系應對
The lucrative nature of MEV has sparked a technological arms race, with various stakeholders developing increasingly sophisticated systems to extract, distribute, or mitigate MEV. This competition has driven significant innovation in blockchain infrastructure while raising important questions about equitable participation.
MEV 所帶來的高利潤引發了技術軍備競賽，各方參與者紛紛開發更複雜的系統來擷取、分配或減輕 MEV 影響。這場競賽推動區塊鏈基礎建設大幅創新，同時也引發了對公平參與的重要討論。
Specialized MEV Infrastructure
專用 MEV 基礎設施
The MEV ecosystem has spawned purpose-built infrastructure designed to streamline value extraction. Flashbots, the most prominent example, developed MEV-Boost - a middleware service that creates a marketplace for block space. This system allows validators to auction their block-building rights to specialized builders who optimize transaction ordering for MEV extraction.
MEV 生態系衍生了專為價值擷取設計的基礎建設。最著名的例子是 Flashbots，其開發了 MEV-Boost——一個建立區塊空間市場的中介服務。這個系統讓驗證者可以把區塊構建權拍賣給專業建塊者，這些建塊者會優化交易排序以提高 MEV 擷取效率。
The builder returns a portion of the extracted value to the validator, creating a mutually beneficial arrangement.
建塊者會將部分擷取到的價值返還給驗證者，實現互利合作。
MEV-Boost's market dominance is striking: since Ethereum's transition to proof-of-stake, over 90% of blocks have been produced using this infrastructure. This widespread adoption has effectively created a shadow market for transaction ordering rights, with daily MEV-Boost auctions regularly exceeding $1 million in total value.
MEV-Boost 市場占有率驚人：自以太坊轉為權益證明（PoS）以來，有超過 90% 的區塊是透過該基礎設施生成。此廣泛採用，實質上創造了交易排序權利的地下市場，MEV-Boost 每日拍賣的總價值經常超過 100 萬美元。
While improving gas efficiency by reducing failed transactions, this system has drawn criticism for exacerbating centralization and potentially creating systemic risks through its dominance of block production.
雖然此系統透過減少失敗交易提高了 gas 使用效率，但也因加劇中心化並可能因主宰區塊生產帶來系統性風險而受到批評。
Related infrastructure includes specialized mempool observation systems, strategic transaction routing services, and MEV-aware wallet integrations. Major DeFi players like 1inch and Matcha have incorporated MEV protection directly into their interfaces, routing transactions through protective relayers that shield users from common extraction strategies.
相關基礎設施還包括專業的 Mempool 監測系統、策略性交易路由服務，以及內建 MEV 保護機制的錢包整合。像 1inch 和 Matcha 等主要 DeFi 平台已直接在介面中提供 MEV 保護，透過防護型轉發器將用戶交易送達，以隔絕常見的擷取手法。
Privacy-Preserving Technologies
隱私保護技術
A technological counterpoint to MEV extraction has emerged in the form of privacy-preserving transaction protocols. These systems employ cryptographic techniques to obscure transaction details until execution, theoretically eliminating the information asymmetries that enable MEV extraction.
針對 MEV 擷取的技術反制方案，包括各種隱私保護型交易協議。這些系統運用加密技術，在交易執行前隱藏其細節，理論上可消除致使 MEV 擷取的資訊不對稱狀況。
Approaches include:
- Encrypted Mempools: Systems like Shutter Network and SUAVE encrypt transaction data using threshold cryptography, preventing MEV extractors from viewing pending transactions
- Commit-Reveal Schemes: Protocols where users first commit to a transaction hash, then reveal the actual transaction details only after inclusion in a block
- Zero-Knowledge Proofs: Advanced cryptographic constructions that allow transaction validation without revealing transaction details
相關方式包括：
- 加密 Mempool：如 Shutter Network 及 SUAVE 等系統使用門限加密對交易資料加密，防止 MEV 擷取者看到未確認交易
- 承諾-揭露機制：協議讓用戶先提交交易哈希，僅在納入區塊後才揭露實際細節
- 零知識證明：先進的密碼學設計，允許交易驗證而無需揭露詳細內容
While promising, these solutions face significant technical challenges, including increased computational overhead, complex key management requirements, and compatibility issues with existing smart contracts. Early implementations have shown promise - Shutter Network's testnet demonstrated a 89% reduction in front-running during controlled experiments—but production-ready systems remain in development.
雖然這些方案具潛力，但目前仍面臨諸多技術難題，包括計算負擔加重、密鑰管理複雜，以及與現有智能合約的相容性問題。初步實作展現良好成效——如 Shutter Network 測試網在控制實驗中搶先交易案例減少 89%——但要達到生產級規模，系統仍在研發中。
Regulatory Considerations and Institutional Engagement
監管考量與機構參與
The regulatory landscape surrounding MEV remains nebulous, with practices like front-running and transaction reordering occupying legal gray areas in decentralized systems. Traditional financial markets have clear regulations against similar activities, with front-running explicitly prohibited under most securities laws. However, blockchain's pseudonymous nature and global operation complicate regulatory enforcement.
有關 MEV 的監管現況仍不明確，如搶先交易和交易重排序等行為在去中心化系統中屬於法律灰色地帶。傳統金融市場對此類行為有明確法規，搶先交易在多數證券法下明文禁止；然而，區塊鏈的偽匿名特性及全球運作，讓監管執法變得更為複雜。
Recent enforcement actions suggest growing regulatory interest in MEV-related activities. In March 2023, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) brought charges against a trading firm for allegedly manipulating liquidation markets on a major DeFi protocol, signaling that authorities may view certain MEV strategies as forms of market manipulation despite occurring on permissionless networks.
近期的執法行動顯示監管機構對 MEV 相關活動的興趣日增。2023 年 3 月，美國商品期貨交易委員會（CFTC）對一家交易公司提出控訴，指其涉嫌操縱某大型 DeFi 協議的清算市場，這代表主管機關即使在開放式網路，也可能視部分 MEV 策略為市場操縱行為。
This regulatory uncertainty hasn't deterred institutional participation. Traditional finance firms have increasingly allocated resources to MEV strategies, applying sophisticated quantitative techniques to on-chain markets. Jump Trading, Cumberland, and other established market makers have established dedicated MEV teams, while venture capital has flowed into MEV infrastructure startups. Notably, Flashbots raised $60 million at a $1 billion valuation in early 2023, underscoring institutional confidence in MEV's long-term value proposition.
這種監管上的不確定性並沒有阻止機構級參與。傳統金融企業正積極投入資源發展 MEV 策略，並將先進量化技術應用於鏈上市場。Jump Trading、Cumberland 等知名做市商已設立專門的 MEV 團隊，且創投資金源源不斷投入 MEV 基礎設施新創公司。值得一提的是，Flashbots 於 2023 年初以 10 億美元估值籌得 6,000 萬美元，凸顯機構對 MEV 長期價值的信心。
The institutionalization of MEV brings both benefits and concerns: improved market surveillance and risk management practices may enhance ecosystem stability, but institutional advantages in capital and technology risk accelerating centralization trends already evident in MEV extraction.
MEV 的機構化帶來福禍參半：市場監控和風管機制可提升生態系穩定性，但資本和技術的機構優勢卻有加速已然明顯的 MEV 擷取中心化趨勢之虞。
Future Trajectories and Systemic Implications
未來趨勢與系統性影響
The evolution of MEV practices continues to reshape blockchain economics, with several emerging trends likely to define its future development. Understanding these trajectories is essential for protocols, users, and regulators seeking to navigate the complex incentives at play in decentralized systems.
MEV 實務的演進正持續重塑區塊鏈經濟，有若干新興趨勢有望決定其未來發展向。對於協議設計者、用戶及監管機關來說，理解這些演變路徑，有助於在去中心化系統的複雜誘因中導航。
Cross-Chain and Layer 2 MEV Dynamics
跨鏈與 Layer 2 的 MEV 動態
As blockchain activity increasingly migrates to Layer 2 solutions and alternative Layer 1 networks, MEV extraction is following suit - but with important differences in mechanism and distribution. On optimistic rollups like Arbitrum and Optimism, the sequencer role (which orders transactions before submitting them to Ethereum) creates a centralized point for potential MEV extraction. This centralization potentially simplifies MEV capture while creating new governance challenges around sequencer revenue distribution.
隨著區塊鏈活動日益移轉至 Layer 2 解決方案與其他 Layer 1 網路，MEV 擷取也緊隨其後——但其機制和分配方式有顯著差異。如 Arbitrum 與 Optimism 等樂觀型 rollup，其排序者（sequencer）角色（負責將交易排序後提交主鏈）成為可能的 MEV 擷取中心點。這種中心化一方面簡化了 MEV 擷取，但也帶來排序者收入分配的新治理挑戰。
Data from L2Beat indicates that Layer 2 networks processed over $50 billion in transaction volume in Q1 2024, creating significant MEV opportunities. However, the distribution mechanisms differ substantially from Layer 1 systems. Optimism, for instance, has implemented retroactive public goods funding using a portion of sequencer MEV revenue, effectively socializing extraction profits to support ecosystem development. This approach offers a potential template for redistributing MEV value beyond validators and searchers.
根據 L2Beat 的數據，2024 年第一季 Layer 2 網絡處理的交易總額逾 500 億美元，創造大量 MEV 機會。然而，這些系統的分配機制與 Layer 1 大不相同。例如 Optimism 已導入回溯性公共物資資助，將部分排序者的 MEV 收入用於支持生態系發展，使擷取所得社會化。這個做法也為將 MEV 價值擴及驗證者、搜尋者之外提供了新模板。
Cross-chain MEV represents a further frontier, with sophisticated arbitrageurs exploiting price differences between assets on different blockchains. These opportunities require complex infrastructure spanning multiple networks and often involve specialized bridge mechanisms. While technically challenging, cross-chain MEV potentially offers larger extraction opportunities due to the fragmentation of liquidity across ecosystems.
跨鏈 MEV 則是下一個前沿領域，進階套利者可利用不同鏈上資產之間的價格差異創造空間。這類機會需跨多鏈、並常涉及橋接機制。雖然技術上更具挑戰性，但由於生態系流動性分散，跨鏈 MEV 擷取的空間更大。
MEV Redistribution Mechanisms
MEV 再分配機制
Recognition of MEV's systemic importance has sparked innovation in redistribution mechanisms, with various protocols experimenting with approaches to share extraction value more equitably:
由於 MEV 的系統性重要性受到重視，市場開始創新各種再分配機制，不少協議正在試驗更公平分配擷取價值的方法：
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MEV Auctions: Systems where validators auction transaction ordering rights, with proceeds partially returned to users
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Protocol-Owned MEV: Designs
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MEV 拍賣機制：驗證者將交易排序權進行拍賣，收益部分返還用戶
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協議擁有的 MEV：設計
where protocols capture and redistribute MEV value through governance-controlled mechanisms
當協議透過治理機制來捕捉並重新分配 MEV 價值 -
User Rebates: Direct compensation to users who have been affected by MEV extraction, calculated based on transaction characteristics
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用戶回饋：針對受到 MEV 抽取影響的用戶，根據交易特徵直接給予補償
Ethereum researcher Vitalik Buterin has advocated for protocolitization of MEV - incorporating MEV capture and distribution directly into protocol design rather than treating it as an externality. Proposals like proposer-builder separation (PBS) aim to create more transparent and equitable markets for block space while preserving the economic incentives that MEV provides for network security.
以太坊研究員 Vitalik Buterin 曾主張 MEV 協議化 —— 將 MEV 的捕捉與分配直接納入協議設計內部，而非將其視為外部性。像 proposer-builder separation（PBS）這類提案，旨在創造更加透明與公平的區塊空間市場，同時保留 MEV 為網路安全提供的經濟誘因。
Some protocols have implemented innovative approaches to MEV redistribution. CoWSwap uses batch auctions and off-chain solvers to capture MEV and return it to users through improved execution prices. Similarly, Osmosis on the Cosmos ecosystem employs a threshold-based mechanism where a portion of MEV profits are returned to the protocol treasury, funding ongoing development and liquidity incentives.
有些協議已經實作了創新的 MEV 重新分配方式。CoWSwap 利用批次拍賣和鏈下解算器來捕捉 MEV，並透過改善成交價格的方式返還給用戶。類似地，Cosmos 生態系統中的 Osmosis 採用門檻制機制，將部分 MEV 利潤返還到協議金庫，用於持續開發與流動性激勵。
Technical Innovations in MEV Mitigation
Technical approaches to MEV mitigation continue to evolve, with several promising directions:
MEV 緩解的技術方法持續演進，目前已有數個具潛力的方向：
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Time-Based Ordering: Protocols like Chainlink's Fair Sequencing Services (FSS) implement time-based transaction ordering, removing validator discretion in sequencing
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基於時間的排序：如 Chainlink 的 Fair Sequencing Services（FSS）這類協議實作以時間為依據的交易排序，消除驗證人在排序上的主觀裁量空間
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Threshold Encryption: Systems that keep transaction details encrypted until execution, preventing front-running and sandwich attacks
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門檻加密：系統在執行前加密交易細節，防止搶跑交易與三明治攻擊
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Batch Auctions: Mechanisms that collect multiple transactions and execute them at a uniform clearing price, eliminating ordering advantages
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批次拍賣：收集多筆交易並以統一清算價格執行，消除排序優勢
Research from Stanford University's Blockchain Research Center suggests that time-based ordering mechanisms can reduce extractable MEV by up to 90% in certain protocols, though with trade-offs in execution latency and throughput. These approaches represent a promising direction for reducing the negative externalities of MEV while preserving its beneficial effects on market efficiency.
史丹佛大學區塊鏈研究中心的研究指出，在部分協議中，以時間為基礎的排序機制可以降低最多達 90% 的可抽取 MEV，但會在執行延遲和吞吐量方面有所權衡。這些方法展現了在降低 MEV 負面外部性同時保留其對市場效率有益影響上的可行方向。
Governance and Power Distribution
Perhaps the most consequential question surrounding MEV concerns its long-term impact on blockchain governance and power distribution. As MEV extraction becomes increasingly professionalized and capital-intensive, the concentration of these capabilities among a small set of specialized firms raises concerns about influence over protocol development and governance.
MEV 最具影響力的問題，也許是其對區塊鏈治理和權力分配的長遠影響。隨著 MEV 抽取越來越專業化、資本密集化，這些能力集中在少數專業公司手中，也引發了他們對協議發展和治理影響力的擔憂。
Research by Cornell University's Initiative for Cryptocurrencies and Contracts (IC3) suggests that entities controlling significant MEV extraction capability can potentially influence governance votes through subtle economic incentives, even without holding large token positions directly. This influence operates through various channels, including preferential transaction ordering for aligned proposals and strategic transaction censorship during contentious governance votes.
康乃爾大學加密貨幣與合約計劃（IC3）的研究指出，擁有大量 MEV 抽取能力的實體，即使沒有直接持有大量代幣，也能透過微妙的經濟誘因來影響治理投票。這種影響可透過多種管道實現，例如：為同陣營的提案提供優先排序，或在激烈的治理投票期間進行策略性交易審查。
The response to these governance challenges remains uncertain. Some protocols have implemented governance mechanisms explicitly designed to resist MEV-driven influence, including multi-stage voting processes and time-locked execution periods. Others have embraced MEV as an inherent aspect of on-chain governance, designing systems that make extraction opportunities transparent and accessible to diverse participants.
因應這些治理挑戰，目前尚未有定論。有些協議實作了明確設計用來抗衡 MEV 影響的治理機制，包括多階段投票程序和定時執行期。而另一些協議則將 MEV 視為鏈上治理的內在特徵，設計讓抽取機會透明而且可被多元參與者接觸的系統。
Final thoughts
The MEV economy represents a fundamental evolution in blockchain incentive structures, transforming validators from passive transaction processors into active market participants with complex financial motivations. This transformation challenges simplistic narratives about blockchain as a purely neutral infrastructure while creating new opportunities for financial innovation and protocol design.
MEV 經濟代表了區塊鏈激勵結構的根本演化，將驗證人從被動的交易處理者，轉變為具有複雜財務動機的積極市場參與者。這種轉變不僅挑戰了區塊鏈“純中立基礎建設”的簡化敘事，還帶來了金融創新與協議設計的新機會。
Understanding MEV requires acknowledging its duality: it simultaneously enhances market efficiency through rapid arbitrage and price discovery while potentially undermining equitable access through systematic advantages for technically sophisticated participants. This tension between efficiency and fairness defines the ongoing debate around MEV's role in decentralized ecosystems.
理解 MEV 必須承認其雙重性：它一方面透過快速套利和價格發現提升市場效率，另一方面也可能因技術精良參與者的系統性優勢而削弱平等參與。這種效率與公平性的張力，正是去中心化生態系統中有關 MEV 角色爭論的核心所在。
For developers and protocol designers, the MEV-aware future demands careful consideration of transaction ordering mechanisms, privacy preserving techniques, and value distribution systems. The strategic choices made today around MEV extraction and mitigation will shape the economic landscape of blockchain for years to come. For users, knowledge of MEV dynamics enables more informed participation in decentralized finance. Understanding the invisible costs of transaction ordering, the risks of public mempool exposure, and the available protection mechanisms allows users to navigate the complex DeFi landscape more effectively.
對於開發者與協議設計者而言，面對 MEV 意識崛起的未來，必須審慎思考交易排序機制、隱私保護技術與價值分配系統。今日有關 MEV 抽取與緩解的策略選擇，將決定區塊鏈未來數年的經濟版圖。對於用戶來說，了解 MEV 動態能促使其更有智慧地參與去中心化金融。理解交易排序的隱性成本、公開記憶池暴露的風險，以及現有的保護機制，可使用戶能更有效地在複雜的 DeFi 生態中遊走。