GENIUS 法案於 2025 年 7 月在白宮正式簽署為法律。
“美國穩定幣國家創新指南法”(Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act,簡稱 GENIUS Act)是首部針對穩定幣(錨定美元等穩定資產的加密貨幣)的美國聯邦法律。
2025 年 7 月 18 日,總統唐納德·川普簽署 GENIUS 法案,為加密產業開創新篇章。此一指標性法案為支付型穩定幣(可 1:1 兌換法定貨幣的數位代幣)建立明確監管架構,並引入保障消費者與金融體系的機制。
本文將說明 GENIUS 法案內容、立法背景、進程,以及對穩定幣市場及整體加密產業的影響,同時探討其優缺點及對全球金融可能帶來的變革。
背景:為何穩定幣需要規範
近年來,穩定幣使用量激增,已成加密經濟核心。這類代幣(如 USDT、USDC、DAI 等)通常維持在 1 美元價值,使「數位美元」能在區塊鏈上快速、低成本流通。2025 年,美國每日期穩定幣交易量約達 700 億美元,全球市值破數千億。穩定幣集結加密貨幣的速度與可編程性,並兼具法幣的穩定性,廣泛用於交易、支付、跨境匯款。然而,過去穩定幣在法律上處於模糊地帶,缺乏聯邦直接監管。
多起重大事件凸顯無監管下的風險。 2019 年,Facebook 推出名為 Libra/Diem 的全球性穩定幣計畫,引發監管單位擔憂科技巨頭發行私人貨幣,推動立法討論。2022 年 5 月,演算法穩定幣 TerraUSD(UST)崩跌、失去 $1 匯率,造成超過 400 億美元損失,讓全球看清穩定幣若出事將重創投資人乃至市場。Terra 崩潰後,美國財長葉倫警告:需儘快建立穩定幣監管框架,否則恐危及金融穩定。2023 年 3 月,主流穩定幣 USDC 因存底銀行(矽谷銀行)爆雷短暫失去掛鉤,雖因監管介入最終恢復,但揭示了儲備資產風險。
過去,監管機構與專家長期討論如何控管這些風險。2021 年底,總統金融市場工作小組建議國會要求穩定幣發行者取得保險銀行資格,但方案無疾而終。多項法案曾提出(如 2020 “STABLE Act”、2022 年參議院的穩定幣特許方案等),但都未通過。部分發行者持有州級執照(如紐約 BitLicense),另有國際發行商(如 Tether)未受美國實質監管。
到 2023-24 年間,立法壓力升高。產業與監管人士均認同不能再任憑穩定幣成為「蠻荒西部」。支持者主張清晰規範可釋放創新能量,將「數位美元」納入正規監管體系,而監管層則強調需立法保障用戶和金融體系免於系統性風險。政策制定者也認為,美國透過穩定幣可鞏固美元全球地位,讓穩定幣資產流向美國國債,進一步強化美元儲備貨幣角色。
在此背景下,2024 年美國大選帶來突破契機。新上任的川普政府展現挺幣友善態度,推動美國成為「全球加密之都」。就任(2025 年 1 月)後,政府將加密立法列為優先事項。眾議院由 French Hill(阿肯色州)和 Bryan Steil(威斯康辛州)提出了 2025 年 STABLE 法案;參議院則由 Bill Hagerty(田納西州)提出具跨黨派支持的 GENIUS 法案。2025 年,在和諧的政治氛圍下,國會終於推動穩定幣法案過關,打破多年僵局。
推動立法:GENIUS 法案的政壇歷程
GENIUS 法案在國會審議過程中速度罕見之快,顯示兩黨罕見共識。2025 年春季,參議院銀行委員會以 18:6 批准法案。6 月,全院以「跨黨派多數」通過 S.1582(GENIUS 法案)。眾議院針對是否納入自家 STABLE 法部分條文展開談判,最終為求儘速通過,直接以 308 比 122 採納參議院版本。這一壓倒性票數反映共和黨、眾多民主黨跨黨聯手(對比前一年民主黨主導參院時,穩定幣法案曾卡關)。
川普總統於 2025 年 7 月 18 日親自在白宮簽署 GENIUS 成法,現場氣氛熱烈,並宣布「加密週」— 同期國會也推進加密市場結構及禁止美國發行央行數字貨幣等相關法。川普盛讚 GENIUS 法案是「確保美國主導全球金融與加密技術的重大一步」,證明美國要領先金融科技,不讓中國或歐洲搶佔先機。支持者認為,該法案將使美國穩定幣成為全球黃金標準,吸引創新與投資流入美國。
但此案並非毫無爭議。國會中主要來自民主黨的反對者憂慮監管不夠嚴謹,可能造成長期金融風險,讓大型科技與商業公司發行「私人貨幣」,衝擊傳統銀行體系。(雖然法案對非金融企業發行設有嚴格限制,但反對者認為不夠嚴密。)另有立委主張應規定發行者必須為有 FDIC 保險的銀行,略顯安全。曾參與前任國會穩定幣立法的 Maxine Waters(加州民主黨)認為,最終通過的版本過於倉促,缺乏部分消費者保護條款。
私人利益也成為爭議焦點。民主黨人質疑川普家族企業據傳投資於新穩定幣(由 World Liberty Financial 發行的「USD1」),憂慮總統本人的利益可能因法案受惠,而現行法律僅要求官員公開五千美元以上加密持有,並未明令現任總統禁持加密資產。白宮則回應川普資產已進盲目信託,無利益衝突。不過,在川普家族推出 meme 幣及加密業務同時政府推進友善法案,仍引發質疑。相關爭議一度險些危及法案推進,但由於法案納入消費者保護及官員揭露條款,最終部分民主黨議員倒戈,與共和黨共同支持此案。 it. The final votes indicate that while 122 members (mostly Democrats) opposed it in the House, a broad bipartisan majority saw the Act as necessary.
最終投票顯示,儘管眾議院有122位成員(多數為民主黨人)反對此法案,但絕大多數跨黨派議員認為該法案是必要的。
It’s worth noting that compromises between the House and Senate versions shaped the final Act. For example, the House’s STABLE Act had proposed a two-year moratorium on “endogenously collateralized stablecoins” – essentially a temporary ban on algorithmic stablecoins not fully backed by real assets. The GENIUS Act as enacted did not impose an outright ban, but instead directs the Treasury to study non-fiat-backed stablecoins (like crypto-collateralized tokens) within one year. This reflects a compromise: addressing concerns about another Terra-style algorithmic coin without completely freezing innovation in that area. Another sticking point was whether non-financial companies (e.g. big tech firms) should be allowed to issue stablecoins. The final law takes a middle road – generally barring commercial (non-financial) companies from being issuers, unless a top-level regulator committee unanimously exempts them for a particular case. The House bill, by contrast, did not explicitly restrict big tech issuers. Here the Senate/Genius approach won out, likely due to bank lobby influence and bipartisan agreement that mixing “Big Tech and Big Finance” raised risks. In fact, the Independent Community Bankers of America (ICBA) had lobbied to “bar Big Tech or other commercial firms from issuing stablecoins or affiliating with issuers” – a priority that the GENIUS Act substantially addresses.
值得注意的是,最終法案是在眾議院與參議院版本的妥協下成形。例如,眾議院的STABLE法案曾提議對「內生抵押穩定幣」實施兩年暫緩期——基本上就是對未完全以實體資產作為擔保的演算法穩定幣的臨時禁令。而實際通過的GENIUS法案並未直接禁止,而是要求財政部在一年內研究非法幣擔保的穩定幣(例如加密資產擔保的代幣)。這反映了一種妥協:一方面回應對另一個類似Terra機制的演算法幣的擔憂,一方面不完全凍結這領域的創新。另一個爭議點是,非金融企業(如大型科技公司)是否應被允許發行穩定幣。最終法律採取中間路線——原則上禁止商業(非金融)公司成為發行人,除非最高層級的監管委員會一致同意為特定個案豁免。相較之下,眾議院版本並未明確限制大型科技公司成為發行人。在這問題上,參議院/GENIUS方案取得勝利,很可能是受到銀行業遊說影響以及兩黨對「科技巨頭與大型金融機構混合」產生風險的共識。其實,美國獨立社區銀行家協會(ICBA)就曾遊說政府「禁止大科技或其他商業公司發行穩定幣或與發行人掛鉤」——這正是GENIUS法案大幅回應的重點。
In sum, the GENIUS Act’s passage was propelled by a unique convergence of industry support, geopolitical ambition, and political trade-offs. The crypto industry poured over $100 million into the 2024 elections to back pro-crypto candidates, and this investment clearly paid dividends as their legislative agenda gained serious momentum. At the same time, there was genuine policymaker concern (across party lines) that without action, stablecoins could either cause a future crisis or be dominated by foreign regimes. As Sen. Lummis put it, “We can’t afford to let USD-backed stablecoins fall through the regulatory cracks – American innovation and the dollar’s primacy are at stake.” With high-level support and compromises in place, the Act sailed through. Now, let’s break down what the GENIUS Act actually does.
總結來說,GENIUS法案的通過是由於業界支持、地緣政治野心及政治妥協的特殊交匯。加密產業在2024年選舉期間投入了一億美元以上,支持親加密貨幣的候選人,這筆投入顯然產生了效益,其立法議程快速推進。與此同時,決策者們(跨黨派)真誠地擔憂,如果不採取行動,穩定幣要嘛導致未來金融危機,要嘛被外國勢力主導。正如參議員Lummis所言:「我們不能讓與美元掛鉤的穩定幣落入監管漏洞──美國的創新與美元主導地位正面臨考驗。」在高層支持與多方妥協下,法案順利通過。接下來,讓我們拆解GENIUS法案實際上的規範內容。
Key Provisions of the GENIUS Act
GENIUS法案的主要條款
The GENIUS Act creates a comprehensive legal framework for “payment stablecoins” in the United States. Here are the most important provisions and requirements under the new law:
GENIUS法案為美國的「支付型穩定幣」建立了完整的法律架構。以下是新法規下最重要的條文與要求:
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Definition of “Payment Stablecoin”: The Act defines a payment stablecoin as a digital asset recorded on a distributed ledger, used as a means of payment or settlement, and redeemable on demand for a stable value of national currency (e.g. $1). In plain terms, this means tokens like USD₮ or USD₵ that people use like money. The definition explicitly excludes things that are already fiat currency, bank deposits, securities, or commodities. By carving out this category, the law makes clear stablecoins are neither securities nor commodities under U.S. law. This resolves a major uncertainty – for example, the SEC had hinted some stablecoins might be securities; now the Act says they are not, putting them under a new bespoke regime of payment instruments.
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「支付型穩定幣」的定義: 本法案將支付型穩定幣定義為:登錄於分散式帳本、作為支付或結算用途,並可隨時以穩定國家貨幣價值(如1美元)兌換的數位資產。簡單來說,就是像USD₮或USD₵這類民眾可當作現金流通使用的代幣。定義明確排除已經屬於法定貨幣、銀行存款、證券或商品的項目。法律以此特別分類,使穩定幣在美國法律下既非證券,也非商品。這解決了一項重大不確定性——例如,美國證券交易委員會曾暗示部分穩定幣可能屬於證券;而本法案明確排除這種情形,讓穩定幣進入一套全新專屬的支付工具監管體系。
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Who Can Issue Stablecoins (Permitted Issuers): It becomes illegal for anyone to issue a payment stablecoin in the U.S. without approval as a Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuer (PPSI). The Act establishes three routes to become a permitted issuer:
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誰可以發行穩定幣(合法發行人): 在美國,未經核可取得「合格支付型穩定幣發行人」(PPSI)資格,任何人都不得發行支付型穩定幣。法案設立三種取得資格的途徑:
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Bank subsidiaries: An insured depository institution (i.e. a bank or credit union) can issue stablecoins through a subsidiary, with approval from its federal banking regulator.
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Nonbank companies via federal charter: Nonbank entities (or uninsured national banks and foreign bank branches) can apply to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) for approval as a stablecoin issuer. The OCC will charter these as a new type of limited-purpose national trust (an uninsured bank charter just for stablecoins). Importantly, nonbanks must generally be financial in nature – the Act restricts public non-financial companies from becoming issuers unless the top regulators unanimously waive the restriction. In other words, Big Tech or other commercial firms cannot freely become stablecoin issuers; only financial players (like fintech companies, payment companies, etc.) are expected to apply, and any exception for a non-financial firm would require sign-off by the Treasury, Fed, and FDIC heads acting together.
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State-regulated issuers (for smaller firms): A nonbank stablecoin issuer that will have under $10 billion in coins outstanding can choose to operate under a state-based regulatory regime, if their state creates one that is “substantially similar” to the federal rules. These issuers must apply to a state stablecoin regulator (e.g. a state banking department) for a license. To prevent regulatory arbitrage, a federal Stablecoin Certification Review Committee (SCRC) – composed of the Treasury Secretary, Fed Chair, and FDIC Chair – will certify whether each state’s rules meet the federal standards. States are given one year from the Act’s effectiveness to set up such regimes. If a state is certified, its licensed issuers can operate nationwide. However, large issuers ($10B) cannot hide in state oversight – once an issuer grows past that threshold, it must transition to federal regulation. Additionally, certain entities cannot use the state option at all: namely, insured banks and any OCC-chartered issuers must be under federal supervision regardless.
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銀行子公司: 受保存款機構(例如銀行或信用合作社)可經由子公司,在獲得聯邦銀行監管機關批准下發行穩定幣。
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非銀行公司(聯邦特許): 非銀行實體(或無保險國家銀行及外國銀行分行)可向美國貨幣監理署(OCC)申請,取得穩定幣發行資格。OCC會設立一種新型態的有限用途全國信託(專為穩定幣而設的無保險銀行特許)。重要的是,非銀行實體原則上必須屬於金融性質——本法限制上市非金融公司成為發行人,除非由最高監管機構一致同意豁免。換句話說,大型科技公司或其他商業公司不得隨意成為穩定幣發行人;只有金融業者(如金融科技公司、支付公司等)預期可申請,非金融企業欲取得例外,必須獲得財政部、聯準會與FDIC主席共同同意。
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州規管發行人(適用於較小公司): 若非銀行穩定幣發行人預計未來流通量低於100億美元,可選擇在州政府設立並通過與聯邦規則「高度類似」的州級監管法制下運作。這類發行人須向州穩定幣監管單位(如州銀行局)申請執照。為杜絕監管套利,聯邦「穩定幣認證審查委員會(SCRC)」——由財政部長、聯準會主席和FDIC主席組成——將審認各州監管規則是否達到聯邦標準。各州自法案生效日起一年內必須設立相關監管機制。若州已獲認證,持牌發行人可全國運作;但大型發行人(超過100億美元)不得藉州監管規避聯邦規範,一旦規模超出,須轉為聯邦管理。此外,特定主體完全不得選擇州監管:即受保銀行及任何OCC特許發行人都必須接受聯邦監管。
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Transitional Grace Periods: Recognizing that stablecoins are already widely used, the law provides generous phase-in periods. The Act’s effective date is the earlier of 18 months after enactment or 120 days after regulators issue final rules. In practice, this likely means around late 2026 before the full requirements kick in. Even after that, there’s an extra grace period for secondary market activities: within 3 years of enactment, any exchange or custodian transacting in stablecoins must ensure they only deal with compliant (approved) stablecoins. This effectively gives unregulated stablecoins a 3-year runway to either seek approval or wind down U.S. operations. During this time, regulators will also be completing rulemaking and companies can prepare to apply. The extended timeline was designed to avoid shocking the crypto markets – it allows Tether, USD₮, and other existing coins time to come into compliance or exit rather than immediately banning them. Law firm analyses note this moratorium “reflects the reality” that stablecoins are entrenched and the transition must be orderly.
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過渡緩衝期: 鑑於穩定幣已被廣泛使用,法律設計了相當寬鬆的分階段實施期。法案生效日期為通過後18個月,或監管機構公布最終規則後120天(取兩者較早者)。實際上,這意味著全面要求大約要到2026年底才會實施。即使如此,對於次級市場交易還有額外緩衝期:在法案生效3年內,任何涉及穩定幣的交易所或託管人,必須確保僅與合規(已核可)穩定幣交易。這實際上給未受監管的穩定幣3年時間申請核可或逐步結束美國業務。在此期間,監管單位也將完善細則,而企業可準備申請。如此設計,是為避免對加密市場造成衝擊——允許Tether、USD₮及其他現有代幣有時間達成合規或有序退出,而非即刻禁止。多家律師事務所的評析也指出,這項寬限「反映市場現實」,認為穩定幣早已深植市場,轉型必須有秩序。
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Reserve Requirements – 1:1 Safe Assets: Every payment stablecoin must be fully backed by high-quality liquid assets on a one-to-one basis. The Act mandates at least $1 of “permitted reserves” for every $1 stablecoin issued. Permitted reserve assets are strictly defined to ensure safety and liquidity. They include: U.S. coins and currency (cash), deposits at insured banks or credit unions, short-term U.S. Treasury bills, Treasury-backed repo or reverse-repo agreements, shares in government money market funds, central bank reserve balances, and other similar low-risk, dollar-denominated assets that regulators approve. Notably, this list excludes riskier instruments – no corporate bonds, equities, crypto assets, or exotic investments can count as reserves. Even longer-term Treasuries (bonds) aren’t mentioned, implying reserves should stay in cash or cash-equivalents with minimal price volatility. This is to prevent scenarios where reserve assets lose value or can’t be quickly sold during redemptions. Rehypothecation (re-using) of reserves is largely prohibited: issuers can use reserve assets only for limited purposes like honoring redemptions or as collateral in short-term repo markets. They cannot leverage reserves to fund investments or pay interest to coin holders. In short, stablecoin issuers must operate as full-reserve institutions, not fractional banks – every token is backed by an actual dollar or equivalent held in reserve, insulating stablecoins from runs (in theory).
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準備金要求——一對一安全資產: 每一單位支付型穩定幣都必須以高品質流動性資產,進行一對一全額擔保。法案規定,每發行1美元穩定幣,須持有「合格準備金」至少1美元。合格資產必須嚴格界定,確保安全與流動性。包括:美國流通現金、存放於受保銀行或信用合作社之存款、短期美國國庫券、國庫支持的附購/逆回購契約、政府貨幣市場基金股份、央行準備金餘額,以及監管機關核準的其他類似、低風險、美金計價資產。值得注意,名單明確排除較高風險工具——不得將公司債、股票、加密資產、各類衍生性投資計算為準備金,甚至連長天期的國債也未在列,顯示準備金必須盡可能維持於現金或價值波動極低的等同現金資產。此措施旨在防範資產貶值或在贖回潮時難以快速變現。準備金再抵押(再運用)基本禁止,發行人僅能於特定情境下動用,比如履行贖回、短期回購交易擔保等。不得動用準備金作為投資風險操作或給予持幣人利息。總結而言,穩定幣發行人必須以「全額準備制」運作,不得如傳統銀行「部分準備制」;每一個代幣都由一個實體美元或等值資產保證,理論上防止擠兌發生。
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Redemption Rights and Disclosures: The Act bolsters transparency and accountability of issuers to maintain user confidence:
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贖回權利與資訊揭露: 法案加強發行人的透明度及責任,以維持用戶信心:
- Redemption Policy: Issuers must establish clear policies allowing coin holders to redeem stablecoins on demand for their $1 value (or proportional value). These redemption terms (e.g. how to redeem, any limits or fees) must be publicly disclosed and honored. This ensures stablecoins function as true IOUs for dollars – if you hold a regulated stablecoin, you have a legal right to get real dollars back from the issuer relatively quickly.
- 贖回政策: 發行人必須制定清楚的政策,讓持幣人得以隨時按1美元面值(或相應比例)贖回穩定幣。贖回方式、限制及費用等條件應公開揭露並確實執行。如此,穩定幣才能發揮真正的「兌付票據」作用——持有合規穩定幣,就有法律權利,自發行人那裡相對快速取得實體美元。
- Monthly Reserve Reports: Issuers must publish monthly reports detailing their outstanding stablecoin supply and the composition of their reserve assets. These reports have to be certified by corporate officers for accuracy and even examined by independent public accountants on a regular basis. Additionally, any issuer with >$50 billion in stablecoins outstanding must undergo annual independent audits of its financial statements. This level of transparency is aimed at preventing the kind of skepticism that long surrounded Tether’s reserves – under GENIUS, stablecoin reserves will face scrutiny akin to regulated financial statements, giving the public and regulators insight into exactly how coins are backed.
- 每月準備金報告: 發行人必須每月公開發行中穩定幣數量及準備金明細。報告須由公司高層認證正確性,且定期接受獨立會計師查核。若單一發行人穩定幣流通量超過五百億美元,必須進行年度獨立財報審計。如此高度透明,正是為防堵Tether等長期遭市場質疑「準備金不明」的情形——GENIUS法案下,穩定幣準備金將如受監理財報般嚴格接受審查,公眾與監管機關得以清楚了解發行人如何支撐每一枚穩定幣。
- No Interest or “Yield” to Holders: To avoid unfair competition with bank deposits and eliminate any incentive for risky asset backing, the Act prohibits stablecoin issuers from paying interest or rewards to coin holders. Your stablecoins won’t earn yield just by sitting in your wallet (though you could separately lend them out via other platforms).
- 不得對持幣人支付利息或「收益」: 為避免與銀行存款形成不公平競爭,以及杜絕發行人追逐高風險資產準備以提高收益的誘因,本法明文禁止穩定幣發行人對持幣人支付利息或任何形式的報酬。你的穩定幣光是保留在錢包內將不會產生收益(但你可自行經其他平台借貸獲利)。Lawmakers and bankers pushed for this ban to prevent a scenario where consumers pull money from banks to hold stablecoins for higher interest. Stablecoins are to serve as a payments medium, not an investment product – so the law explicitly disallows any interest-bearing stablecoin accounts that could mimic bank accounts. (This responded to community banks’ fears that interest-paying stablecoins would “disintermediate” banks by luring away deposits).
立法者與銀行業者推動這項禁令,是為了防止消費者將資金從銀行中提領出來,轉而持有穩定幣以追求更高利息。穩定幣應該做為支付媒介,而非投資產品——因此法律明確禁止任何能獲取利息的穩定幣帳戶,以防其模仿銀行帳戶的功能。(這是針對社區銀行擔心「支付利息的穩定幣會將存款吸走、造成銀行被排擠」的憂慮所作回應。)
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Capital and Liquidity Standards: Though not as heavily capitalized as banks, issuers will face prudential standards. The law instructs federal and state regulators to set tailored capital, liquidity, and risk management rules for stablecoin issuers, proportionate to their business models. Importantly, the Act exempts stablecoin issuers from traditional bank capital requirements like Basel capital ratios. Since issuers are not lending out deposits (hence no credit risk), they don’t need the same equity buffers as banks; however, they may still need to hold some minimal capital to absorb operational losses or unexpected expenses. Regulators will define these specifics in upcoming rulemakings (due within one year of enactment). Issuers will also have to maintain appropriate liquidity (i.e. enough cash or overnight assets to meet redemption surges) and put in place rigorous risk management frameworks (covering operational risks like cybersecurity, fraud, etc.).
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資本與流動性標準: 雖然發行商不需像銀行一樣擁有大量資本,但仍須遵循審慎的監管標準。法律指示聯邦及州監管機構,根據穩定幣發行商的業務模式,制定量身訂做的資本、流動性與風險管理規範。重點是,本法案豁免穩定幣發行商遵守傳統銀行資本要求(如巴塞爾資本比率)。由於發行商不從事存款放貸(因此無信貸風險),不需要像銀行那般的股本緩衝;然而,他們仍須持有一定最低資本,以吸收營運損失或突發費用。相關細節由監管機構在未來一年內制定細則。發行商同時必須維持適當流動性(例如充足現金或隔夜資產應對大量贖回),並建立嚴謹風險管理架構(涵蓋資安、詐欺等營運風險)。
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Regulatory Oversight and Examinations: Once licensed, stablecoin issuers will be subject to ongoing supervision much like other financial institutions:
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監管與查核: 穩定幣發行商取得執照後,將如同其他金融機構一樣,接受持續性監督:
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Primary Regulator: A permitted issuer under the federal regime will be overseen by the same federal agency that supervises its type of institution – for a bank subsidiary, that might be the Federal Reserve or OCC or FDIC (whichever supervises the parent bank); for a nonbank with an OCC charter, it’s the OCC; for a credit union subsidiary, the NCUA. The law dubs these agencies the “Primary Federal Payment Stablecoin Regulators.” They are empowered to examine issuers’ books, require regular reports, and enforce compliance. If an issuer violates any requirement of the Act or any conditions of its license, regulators can issue enforcement orders or even suspend/revoke the issuer’s permission to operate. This is a significant shift from the previous environment where some stablecoin firms were effectively under no federal supervision. Under GENIUS, regulators can act swiftly if an issuer is taking undue risks or endangering customers.
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主要監管機關: 聯邦體系下的合法發行商,將由監管其同類機構的聯邦機關負責——如果是銀行子公司,則可能是聯邦儲備銀行(Fed)、貨幣監理署(OCC)或聯邦存款保險公司(FDIC),取決於母公司受誰監督;非銀行且領有OCC憑證者由OCC監管;信用合作社子公司則由全國信用合作社管理局(NCUA)監管。法律將這些機關稱為「主要聯邦支付穩定幣監管單位」。這些機關有權查核發行商帳冊、要求定期報告以及執行規範。如發行商違反法案或執照條件,監管機關可發布命令、甚至暫停或撤銷其營運資格。這與以往部分穩定幣公司幾乎未受聯邦監管的狀況大有不同。在GENIUS體制下,若發行商冒險或危及客戶,監管機關可即刻介入。
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State Regulator Oversight: An issuer in the state-regulated path will be supervised by the designated state stablecoin regulator (e.g. a state banking commissioner) in its home state. That state regulator will have primary examination and enforcement authority over the issuer. However, the Fed is given a backstop role: the law allows federal regulators (like the Fed or OCC) to intervene in “unusual and exigent circumstances” if a state-regulated issuer poses a broader risk and the state isn’t acting. States can also voluntarily cede supervision to the Fed if they prefer. This two-tier system aims to respect state innovation while ensuring a federal safety net if something goes awry at a state-licensed issuer. Moreover, any state regime must maintain high standards – if a state’s oversight is deemed insufficient (certification can be revoked by the SCRC), its issuers would lose permission.
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州監管機構監督: 採用州監管路徑的發行商,將由總部所在地指定的州級穩定幣監管單位(例如州銀行局長)負責。該州監管機構擁有主要查核與執法權。除此之外,聯邦準備理事會(Fed)獲得備援角色:若州監管發行商造成更廣泛風險且州政府未採取行動,聯邦監管機構(如Fed或OCC)可在「特殊且緊急情境」下介入。各州如有意願,也可自願讓渡監管權予Fed。這種雙軌制旨在尊重州層級創新,同時確保在州持照發行商發生問題時,有聯邦安全網。此外,各州監管體系必須維持高標準——如某州監管被認定不足(SCRC可撤銷其認證),該州發行商將失去發行權。
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Foreign Issuer Oversight: The Act also tackles how foreign stablecoin issuers can access the U.S. market. A non-U.S. company (say, a European or Asian stablecoin issuer) cannot simply offer its token to U.S. customers unless two conditions are met: (1) its home country has a comparable regulatory framework for stablecoins, and (2) the U.S. Treasury Secretary grants a reciprocity determination for that jurisdiction. The Treasury must set up rules within a year to assess other countries’ regimes. If a foreign regime is deemed equivalent, its licensed issuers can be exempted from needing a U.S. license. Additionally, U.S.-based digital asset service providers (exchanges, custodians) will be forbidden from handling foreign stablecoins that do not meet these standards. In essence, after a phase-in period, only foreign stablecoins from jurisdictions with rigorous oversight will be allowed in U.S. markets, and even those must comply with any U.S. legal orders (like sanctions). This closes a potential loophole where an offshore issuer could bypass U.S. rules – it levels the playing field so that U.S. and foreign issuers face similar compliance burdens if they want access to American customers.
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外國發行商監督: 法案也規範外國穩定幣發行商如何進入美國市場。非美國公司(如歐洲或亞洲穩定幣發行商)僅在符合兩項條件時,才能向美國客戶提供其代幣:(1)其母國有相當完善的穩定幣監管架構,且(2)美國財政部長針對該司法管轄區發出互惠認定。財政部須於一年內制定他國監管評定規則。如該外國體制被認定等同美國,其持照發行商可免申請牌照。此外,美國數位資產服務商(如交易所、託管商)被禁止處理不符標準的國外穩定幣。簡言之,過渡期後,美國市場僅允許來自高度監管地區的外國穩定幣,且即便如此仍須遵守美國相關法令(如制裁)。此舉旨在堵塞離岸發行商繞過美規的漏洞,讓美國與外國發行商負擔相近的合規成本,以公平競爭美國用戶。
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Custody and Investor Protections: The GENIUS Act imposes rules not just on issuers, but also on those who custody stablecoins or their reserves:
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託管與投資人保護: GENIUS法案規範的不僅有發行商,還包括託管穩定幣或其儲備資產的業者:
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Qualified Custodians: Reserve assets of stablecoins (the cash and treasuries backing them) must be held with regulated custodians – entities that are subject to federal or state banking supervision, or SEC/CFTC regulation. This means an issuer can’t just hold billions of reserves at an unregulated affiliate or offshore account; they must use reputable banks, trust companies, or other regulated custodians to safeguard the reserves. Likewise, if a third-party provides custodial services for customers’ stablecoins (e.g. an exchange holding users’ stablecoins in wallets), that custodian must be a regulated financial entity. By bringing custodians under oversight, the Act seeks to prevent Mt. Gox-style losses of digital assets and ensure reserve funds don’t go missing.
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合格託管人: 穩定幣的儲備資產(現金和國庫券)必須交由受監管的託管業者持有——也就是接受聯邦或州銀行監理,或受證券交易委員會(SEC)/商品期貨交易委員會(CFTC)監管的機構。也就是說,發行商不能將數十億儲備金放在未經監管的關係企業或海外帳戶,必須使用合格的銀行、信託公司或其他受監管的託管機構來保護這些資產。同理,若第三方為客戶的穩定幣提供託管(如交易所代管使用者錢包中的穩定幣),該託管人也必須是受監管的金融機構。將託管人納入監理旨在防止像Mt. Gox等數位資產損失事件,確保儲備金不會憑空消失。
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Segregation of Assets: Custodians (including exchanges or wallets) must segregate customers’ stablecoins from the custodian’s own assets and cannot mix or use them for other purposes. In legal terms, the stablecoins (or reserves) held for customers remain the property of the customers, not the custodian. This is crucial if the custodian goes bankrupt – segregated customer assets shouldn’t be available to the custodian’s creditors. In fact, the Act clarifies that a bank need not list custodial stablecoin assets as liabilities on its balance sheet, reinforcing that they are off-balance-sheet, client-owned funds. This kind of provision was informed by experiences where crypto firms’ bankruptcy left customers fighting to reclaim their coins – GENIUS aims to give customers stronger claims.
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資產隔離: 託管人(包含交易所與錢包業者)必須將客戶持有之穩定幣與自身資產完全分離,且不得混用或挪作他用。法律上,託管的穩定幣或儲備對客戶而言仍保有客戶所有權,而非託管人。萬一託管人破產,這些隔離資產不應被用來清償託管人債權人。法案也明定,銀行不需將受託保管的穩定幣資產列為負債,強化其為表外、且屬於客戶的資金。此條款汲取自過去加密公司破產後,客戶須費力爭回資產的經驗——GENIUS意在給予客戶更強主張權。
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Insolvency Priorities: If despite precautions an issuer were to become insolvent, the law protects stablecoin holders by giving them first priority claim on the reserve assets. In other words, stablecoin holders stand ahead of all other creditors in bankruptcy when it comes to those reserve funds. This ensures that, to the extent possible, the remaining reserve assets are used to redeem coin holders first. The Act also empowers bankruptcy courts to pause (stay) stablecoin redemptions temporarily in insolvency, to allow an orderly liquidation of assets. These measures are akin to how customer brokerage assets are treated in a broker-dealer bankruptcy – customers get priority for a return of their property. (Interestingly, the House’s STABLE Act lacked specific issuer insolvency provisions, so the GENIUS Act’s detailed bankruptcy clarity is a step beyond what some expected.)
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破產優先權: 即使採行各種預防措施,若發行商破產,法律保障穩定幣持有者於儲備資產有優先索取權。換言之,在清算時,穩定幣持有人對儲備資產的清償順序,優先於所有其他債權人。這可確保剩餘儲備用於首先償還幣主。法案也授權破產法院於破產程序中暫停穩定幣贖回,以有序清理資產。這些措施類似券商破產時客戶代理資產的處理順序——客戶享有回復自有財產的優先權。(值得一提的是,眾議院STABLE法案並無明訂發行商破產條款,GENIUS法案針對破產清楚明細,超出外界預期。)
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No False Marketing: Issuers are prohibited from using the term “stablecoin” or related names in a way that suggests the coin is government-issued or government-guaranteed. For example, an issuer can’t name their coin “USA Coin” or “FedDollar” if that misleads people to think it’s an official U.S. government currency. This is to prevent any confusion between private stablecoins and an eventual Central Bank Digital Currency (which the Fed might issue someday). Issuers also cannot condition the issuance of a stablecoin on the customer buying some other product – i.e., no tying arrangements like “you can only get our stablecoin if you purchase our company’s stock/token/etc.” Stablecoins must stand on their own as a monetary product.
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禁止虛假宣傳: 發行商不得使用「穩定幣」或相關名稱,讓人誤以為其幣由政府發行或擔保。例如,發行商不得用「USA Coin」或「FedDollar」命名,誤導民眾其為官方美國貨幣。此舉旨在避免民間穩定幣與未來可能由聯準會(Fed)發行的中央銀行數位貨幣(CBDC)混淆。發行商亦不得將購買穩定幣綁定於購買其他產品(如「必須先買本公司股票/代幣才可購買穩定幣」等不當綁售)。穩定幣必須作為一種貨幣產品獨立發行。
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Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Sanctions Compliance: A major focus of the Act is plugging the gap in financial crime compliance. Stablecoin issuers will be treated as “financial institutions” under the Bank Secrecy Act, meaning they must implement full AML programs – verifying customer identities (KYC), monitoring transactions for illicit activity, filing Suspicious Activity Reports, etc.. The law directs FinCEN (the Treasury’s financial crimes unit) to develop tailored AML rules for digital assets within three years. It specifically asks FinCEN to explore “novel methods” of detecting illicit crypto transactions, acknowledging that traditional AML techniques may need adaptation to blockchain (think advanced blockchain analytics tools, AI monitoring of wallets, etc.). Issuers must certify that they have robust AML and sanctions compliance programs in place. Furthermore, anyone convicted of certain financial crimes (like money laundering, fraud, etc.) is barred from serving as an officer or director of a stablecoin issuer – an integrity measure to keep bad actors out of positions of control. Together, these provisions aim to prevent stablecoins from becoming a haven for illicit finance, addressing concerns that criminals or sanctioned entities could otherwise abuse anonymous stablecoin transfers. Notably, the Act also levels the playing field on AML for foreign issuers: overseas stablecoins entering the U.S. must comply with equivalent AML/sanctions standards, so foreign issuers can’t gain advantage by being lax on compliance.
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反洗錢(AML)與制裁合規: 本法案重點在於堵補金融犯罪防制缺口。穩定幣發行商被視為《銀行保密法》下的「金融機構」,必須全面落實反洗錢(AML)計畫——驗證客戶身分(KYC)、監控非法交易活動、申報可疑交易報告等。法律授權財政部金融犯罪執法網(FinCEN)在三年內針對數位資產設計專屬AML規範,並特別要求FinCEN研究「新型方法」以偵測加密資產不法交易,承認傳統AML做法需針對區塊鏈技術做調整(如採用先進區塊鏈分析工具、運用AI追蹤錢包等)。發行商須證明其已建立穩固的AML與制裁合規系統。且凡曾涉及某些金融犯罪(如洗錢、詐欺等)者,禁止擔任穩定幣發行商之高階主管或董事,此為把關誠信、防堵不良份子進入關鍵崗位。全面來看,這些條款旨在避免穩定幣成為非法資金的避風港,回應各界對犯罪或遭制裁團體濫用匿名穩定幣轉帳的疑慮。值得注意的是,法案對外國發行商的AML要求對等:海外穩定幣進入美國,須遵守同樣等級的AML/制裁標準,防止外商「鬆散合規」而不公平競爭。
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Banks and Stablecoins – New Permissions: The Act not only regulates new stablecoin issuers, it also explicitly allows traditional banks to engage with stablecoins in certain ways, which previously had been legally ambiguous. Under GENIUS:
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銀行與穩定幣——新增許可: 本法案不僅規範新穩定幣發行商,也明文允許傳統銀行在部分情境下參與穩定幣業務,這在過去是法律模糊地帶。在GENIUS架構下:
- Banks can hold stablecoins in custody for customers and hold stablecoin reserve assets as deposits. Community banks were concerned they
*(銀行可替客戶託管穩定幣,並將穩定幣儲備資產納為存款。社區銀行過去關心……)*might be cut out, but the law ensures banks can serve as custodians of stablecoins (holding customers’ private keys or wallets) and can receive issuers’ reserve cash as regular deposits. In fact, language was added to clarify that banks can use those reserve deposits to conduct normal lending and banking activities, just as they would with any other deposits, which the community banking sector supported.
(可能會被刪減,但此法律確保銀行可以作為穩定幣的託管人(持有客戶的私鑰或錢包),並能接收發行人的準備金作為普通存款。事實上,法案特別強調,銀行可以像對待其他存款一樣,將這些準備金用於正常放款或銀行業務,此內容也獲得了社群銀行業的支持。) -
Banks may utilize distributed ledgers and issue “tokenized deposits.” The Act explicitly permits banks to use blockchain technology for payments and to tokenize deposits. A tokenized deposit is essentially a stablecoin issued by a bank, fully backed by deposits at that bank (sometimes called “deposit coins”). By green-lighting this, the law paves the way for major banks to roll out their own digital dollar tokens transferable on blockchain networks. For example, JPMorgan’s internal JPM Coin (used for institutional clients) could be expanded more broadly, and other banks like Citi are exploring issuing their own coins now. Citi’s management noted they were “closely monitoring developments… exploring options around issuing our own…coin” in light of stablecoin legislation. This provision essentially integrates stablecoins into the traditional banking system by acknowledging tokenized bank deposits as part of the regulatory framework.
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銀行可利用分散式帳本並發行「代幣化存款」。 法案明確允許銀行使用區塊鏈技術進行支付及將存款代幣化。所謂「代幣化存款」本質上是一種由銀行發行、完全以該銀行存款全額擔保的穩定幣(有時稱作「存款幣」)。這項開放讓主要銀行有機會推出可於區塊鏈網路流通的自家數位美元代幣。例如摩根大通的內部JPM Coin(目前用於機構級客戶)未來能擴大應用,花旗等銀行現階段也正評估自行發行穩定幣。花旗管理層指出,在穩定幣法規出台後,他們「密切關注發展……積極評估發行自家幣的選項」。此條款等於把穩定幣納入傳統銀行體系,將「代幣化存款」正式列入監管框架。
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Other Notable Provisions:
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Disclosure by Government Officials: To address ethical concerns, the law requires the President, Vice President, and executive branch employees to publicly report any stablecoin holdings over $5,000 (similar to how they report stocks). This transparency is intended to highlight and manage any conflicts of interest – a direct response to criticisms that the Trump family’s crypto interests could pose conflicts. While it doesn’t forbid holdings, it at least forces disclosure.
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政府官員持幣申報: 為回應倫理爭議,法律規定總統、副總統與所有行政部門職員,若持有超過5,000美元的穩定幣,需公開申報(類似現有的股票財產申報制度)。此舉在於揭露並防範潛在利益衝突,直接回應如川普家族涉入加密資產所引發的利益質疑。雖未禁止持有,但至少強制資訊曝光。
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No Federal Insurance: The Act clarifies that stablecoins are not insured by the federal government (unlike bank deposits which have FDIC insurance). Issuers must likely disclose this fact. Consumers should understand that while an issuer must hold safe reserves, if those reserves somehow fail, there is no government bailout guarantee. The safety net is the strict oversight and asset requirements, not insurance.
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未受聯邦保險保障: 法案明確說明,穩定幣不享有聯邦政府保險(不同於受FDIC保障的銀行存款),發行人很可能需公開揭露此事。消費者需明瞭,即使發行人必須持有安全準備資產,但若這些準備金出現問題,政府不會負擔救助責任,當前的保障機制是嚴格的監督與資產規定,而不是保險制度。
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Preemption of State Law: The federal framework sets a floor for standards, but it also generally preempts states from imposing conflicting requirements on stablecoin issuers, especially for those under federal oversight. States can have their regime if certified, but they can’t undermine federal rules. This ensures a uniform baseline across the country.
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聯邦法優先於州法: 聯邦架構規範設立基本標準,但原則上會排除州政府另生抵觸規定(特別是受聯邦監管的發行人)。經認證的州可推行自有機制,但不得違背聯邦規定,確保全國一致性。
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Study on “Non-payment Stablecoins”: Beyond the immediate scope, the Act orders regulators to study other crypto tokens that are not used primarily for payments (possibly referring to things like algorithmic or asset-backed tokens outside the dollar realm) including those “endogenously” backed by other cryptos. The results could inform future legislation on those products.
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研究「非支付型穩定幣」: 除立刻涵蓋範疇外,法案要求監管機構調查非主要用於支付的加密資產(可能包括演算法穩定幣、非美元資產擔保穩定幣,或由其他幣本位擔保之「內生性」穩定幣)。調查結果有助於未來相關立法。
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In effect, the GENIUS Act brings stablecoins from a largely unregulated sphere into something akin to a federally regulated e-money system. It draws clear boundaries: Only approved, well-supervised entities may issue U.S. dollar stablecoins; those coins must be fully backed by safe assets; and the entire lifecycle (issuance, custody, usage) is subject to oversight and compliance rules. The penalty for violation is steep – issuing a payment stablecoin without a license or transacting in unapproved stablecoins after the grace period will be unlawful, inviting regulatory enforcement and penalties. This effectively outlaws the “wildcat” era of stablecoin issuance and forces the industry onto a regulated footing. 總體來說,《GENIUS法案》將原本大致不受管理的穩定幣領域,變成類似聯邦監管的電子貨幣體系。法案劃下明確界線:只有經批准且受良好監理的主體可發行美元穩定幣,且必須有足額安全資產作為全額擔保,從發行、託管到用途,全過程皆受監管及合規規則約束。違反規定將受重罰——未領牌而發行支付型穩定幣,或在寬限期後繼續交易未核准穩定幣者將屬違法,並會被監管執法及處罰。這麼一來,「野放時代」結束,產業全面轉向受規管的正軌。
Impacts on the Market and Industry
The GENIUS Act is poised to significantly reshape the stablecoin landscape and reverberate through the crypto industry and beyond. Here’s how various stakeholders and aspects of the market are likely to be affected: GENIUS法案預料將大幅重塑穩定幣生態,對加密產業乃至其他領域產生深遠影響。以下為各類相關方及市場層面的可能衝擊:
1. Stablecoin Issuers – Winners and Losers: The new regime will likely elevate certain stablecoin providers while pressuring others: 1. 穩定幣發行人——贏家與輸家: 新監管框架預料會讓部分穩定幣供應商受益,也給其他參與者帶來壓力:
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U.S.-based compliant issuers like Circle (issuer of USD Coin, USDC) are positioned to gain a competitive edge. Circle has been a vocal supporter of regulation – its Chief Strategy Officer termed stablecoins “digital dollars” and backed the Act’s passage. With clear laws in place, Circle can now seek a federal license or national trust charter to firmly establish USDC as an approved stablecoin. This could increase trust among institutions and users, potentially growing USDC’s market share. Circle’s CEO praised the Act as bringing stablecoins into the mainstream safely, and indeed Circle’s business model of fully reserved, transparent reserves aligns well with the Act’s requirements (it already provides monthly reserve attestations).
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美國本土合規發行商如Circle(USDC發行方),將獲得競爭優勢。Circle一向大力支持監管,首席策略長直言穩定幣是「數位美元」,並背書法案通過。有法規明確後,Circle可直接取得聯邦執照或全國信託章程,把USDC穩穩變成官方認可的穩定幣,提升機構與用戶信任度,市占率有望進一步提升。Circle執行長也稱讚法案讓穩定幣安全進入主流。Circle本身的全額準備、資訊透明營運模式,正好符合法案要求(已經每月公布儲備金證明)。
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Traditional financial institutions and fintechs are now empowered to enter the stablecoin arena. Big banks like JPMorgan Chase and Citigroup had been experimenting with blockchain-based coins internally; the Act explicitly permits them to issue or use stablecoins more broadly. Citi’s CEO Jane Fraser indicated the bank is considering issuing its own coin and is developing digital currency capabilities in anticipation of new law. With regulatory clarity, we may soon see major banks launching bank-backed stablecoins or tokenized deposits for their corporate and retail clients, bringing massive balance sheets into play. Fintech companies and payment firms (PayPal, fintech banks, etc.) may also apply for stablecoin issuer licenses or partner with banks to issue coins. Walmart and Amazon – big tech-related companies mentioned as exploring stablecoins – could now pursue projects via a financial subsidiary or partnership, though they’d need regulatory nods. One industry expert said new legislation would “open the floodgates” for more companies to dive in. In essence, the Act legitimizes stablecoins and invites well-capitalized players to participate, which could greatly expand the stablecoin supply and adoption in coming years.
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傳統金融機構及金融科技公司也受鼓勵進入穩定幣市場。像摩根大通、花旗等大型銀行原本就內部嘗試區塊鏈代幣,法案通過後明確授權能更全面發行/使用穩定幣。花旗執行長Jane Fraser坦言,該行正考慮自行發幣,積極布局數位貨幣。監管落地後,或將見到大型銀行發行專為企業、零售客戶準備的銀行穩定幣或「代幣化存款」,龐大資產規模將進入市場。金融科技業與支付公司(如PayPal及新型網路銀行)也可申請穩定幣發行執照,或與銀行合作發行。沃爾瑪、亞馬遜等科技巨頭若有意進軍穩定幣,則可透過金融子公司或合作,有監管背書。一位產業專家表示,新法例等於「打開水閘」,吸引更多資金雄厚玩家搶進,預期未來穩定幣供應及應用會加速成長。
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On the other hand, offshore and non-compliant stablecoins face an ultimatum. Chief among these is Tether’s USDT, by far the largest stablecoin globally. Tether Ltd. is based outside the U.S. and has operated without U.S. regulatory approval. Under GENIUS, by roughly 2028 (3 years post-enactment), U.S. exchanges and businesses will be prohibited from offering USDT or any unapproved stablecoin. This means Tether must either come into compliance – e.g. by dramatically increasing transparency and possibly seeking U.S. oversight – or risk losing access to the U.S. market entirely. Given Tether’s historically opaque reserve reporting and its principals’ aversion to disclosure, it’s questionable if they would (or could) meet GENIUS standards (such as monthly certified reserve reports, full 1:1 backing in specified assets, U.S. oversight, etc.). If not, exchanges like Coinbase and Kraken would have to delist USDT for U.S. users within three years, and users could be barred from transacting USDT on U.S.-based platforms. That could significantly erode Tether’s dominance, especially if global users shift toward coins that are seen as safer and regulator-approved (like USDC or new bank coins). Observers have noted that the Act “win(s) big” for Circle and U.S. issuers, while putting Tether at a crossroads. Tether might remain popular in markets abroad that distrust government oversight, but its growth prospects would be limited without U.S. institutional adoption. In short, the days of Tether’s near-monopoly might be numbered, as regulated alternatives proliferate.
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另一方面,境外及不合規穩定幣將面臨抉擇。代表為Tether的USDT(全球最大穩定幣),Tether設於境外,無美國執照。GENIUS法案落地三年後(約2028年),美國交易所及企業不得再提供USDT或任何未核准穩定幣。Tether必須要嘛大幅提升透明度並接受美國監管,要嘛失去美國市場。以其過往缺乏透明的儲備資訊及公司高層排斥揭露,市場質疑其能否達標GENIUS嚴格標準(如每月儲備核驗、全額1:1資產背書,美方監理 etc.)。若無法達標,如Coinbase、Kraken等需於三年內下架USDT給美國用戶,消費者也可能被禁止於美國平台交易USDT。屆時Tether市佔率可能大減,尤以全球用戶轉向合規安全(如USDC或銀行發幣)影響最大。各界認為,該法案大贏家為Circle及美國本土發行商,給Tether設下十字路口。Tether或許在反監管的海外市場仍有支持,但無法擴展美國機構用戶。總之,Tether一家獨大的時代恐進入倒數,合規替代品加速普及。
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Algorithmic and crypto-collateralized stablecoins (like DAI, which is backed partly by crypto assets, or any future algorithmic coins) will face increased scrutiny. The Act’s study on endogenous stablecoins suggests regulators may later apply specific rules or restrictions on them. In the interim, these projects may not fall under the “payment stablecoin” definition if they aren’t directly redeemable for fiat; however, if widely used as payment, they could be targeted. For example, DAI is a stablecoin pegged to USD but backed by a basket of assets (including USDC itself and Ether). Since DAI can be redeemed for $1 worth of collateral (not guaranteed $1 cash), it’s not a pure payment stablecoin under the Act’s definition. Still, its issuer (MakerDAO, a decentralized protocol) might be considered an unregulated issuer if DAI is used in commerce. This ambiguity means decentralized stablecoin projects might try to adjust – possibly by decentralizing further (to avoid having a identifiable “issuer”) or by limiting U.S. user access to avoid legal issues. Their market share could diminish if users and exchanges favor fully compliant coins to avoid legal risk. Conversely, some crypto purists might continue using decentralized stablecoins as a form of resistance to government-controlled money, but likely at the margins if mainstream adoption tilts to regulated coins.
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演算法與加密資產擔保型穩定幣(如DAI,部分以加密資產為擔保,或其他未來演算法幣)將遭嚴格審視。法案針對「內生性」穩定幣之研究,暗示監管機構未來或訂定特別規範。短期內,這類計劃若非直接對應法幣兌換,未必被歸類為正式的「支付型穩定幣」,但若廣泛流用於支付,則可能受針對。例如DAI以美元掛鉤,但實由多樣資產(含USDC、以太幣等)擔保。因DAI兌換機制是「以等值資產」而非保證可領1美元現金,故不屬於法案定義下的純支付穩定幣。不過,其發行(如MakerDAO這類去中心化協議)若在商業用途中擁有明確角色,也可能被視為未監管發行人。這種模糊地帶,將促使去中心化幣團隊嘗試進一步去中心化(規避被認定有法定「發行人」),或乾脆限制美國用戶參與,避免觸及法規。若未調整,隨著用戶及交易所普遍轉向全合規幣以避風險,這些去中心化穩定幣市占可能縮減。反之,少數加密極端主義者可能仍堅持用去中心化幣自我對抗政府貨幣,但若法幣穩定幣主流化,這類應用恐淪為邊緣。
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New entrants: The Act creates a clear pathway, so we might see new stablecoin startups emerging – for instance, fintech entrepreneurs launching fully compliant stablecoin firms under state regimes or applying to OCC. Some states (like New York, which already had stablecoin guidance under BitLicense, or Wyoming, which is crypto-friendly) might act quickly to become hubs for state-regulated issuers. Competition could increase as multiple regulated coins enter the market, potentially narrowing spreads and improving services (e.g. faster redemptions, better integrations). However, the high compliance costs (capital, audits, etc.) might limit successful entrants to those with significant financial backing.
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新進者:新法建立明確進入路徑,未來將出現更多新型穩定幣創業公司——例如金融科技業者於州層級創立合規穩定幣公司,或直接向OCC申請核准。一些州(如原已有BitLicense監管經驗的紐約,和友善加密的懷俄明州),可能搶先成為州級監管發行人重鎮。隨著多家持牌穩定幣進市場,競爭升溫,手續費降低、服務優化(如兌換更快、更好整合)等有望兌現。不過,因合規門檻(資本、審計等)高,最終仍以有強大金援者居多。
2. Crypto Exchanges and Service Providers: Exchanges, trading platforms, and wallet providers will have to adapt their offerings. In the near term (next 1–2 2. 加密貨幣交易所及服務商: 交易所、平台及錢包服務商將被迫調整產品線。短期內(未來1–2...years),他們可以在新規則逐步上路的期間繼續支持現有的穩定幣。但在中期來看:
- 美國本土的交易所(Coinbase、Kraken、Gemini 等)很可能會統一只支援少數獲核准的穩定幣。我們可以預期他們會大力推廣像 USDC(特別是由 Coinbase 共同創立的 USDC)以及任何由受監管機構發行的穩定幣,也有可能包含他們自家的——例如,Gemini 已在紐約監管下發行 GUSD,未來也可能尋求聯邦批准來拓展業務。這些交易所也必須將未能在 2028 年前達到合規標準的穩定幣下架或限制地區性交易。若 Tether (USDT) 繼續欠缺透明度,極有可能會被美國市場下架。規模較小或較新的穩定幣(若未達到法案嚴格定義的「支付型穩定幣」,或未被核可)將根本無法提供給美國用戶。至於像數位歐元代幣或非核准國家發行的外國穩定幣,美國交易所基本會避免上架,除非財政部正式亮綠燈。
- 市場流動性 可能將圍繞合規穩定幣進一步集中。如果 USDT 在美國的流通逐步減少,交易所上的交易對將轉向 USDC 或其他獲准穩定幣。這些穩定幣的流動性反而可能提升,因為機構投資者會更願意使用受到政府監管、資訊透明的代幣。Coinbase 的股價在眾議院通過法案後有所上揚,這大概反映投資人預期監管明朗後,市場上的加密交易及新產品將能順利展開,不用再擔心踩到法律紅線。
- 海外交易所與 DeFi 協議 服務美國用戶時會面臨取捨:要麼確保僅提供經核可的穩定幣,要麼將美國用戶區隔出去。由於美國市場規模龐大,多數全球性中心化交易所(如 Binance.US 或其他)預計都會選擇配合合規。真正去中心化的交易所較難管制——法律主要針對「為獲利而…交易」穩定幣的單位(即指企業,不是個人)。DeFi 協議本身很難被直接起訴,但任何美國本土的介面以及美國籍節點運營者都可能被納入規範。預計監管機關會發布指引,即使在 DeFi 領域,仲介者(如前端網站運營者)在寬限期後也不得協助非法穩定幣交易。這可能會導致部分 DeFi 活動外移或轉地下,若有人打算繼續使用不合規穩定幣。另一方面,主流 DeFi 領域也可能適應法規,僅整合白名單上的合規穩定幣。實際上,合規穩定幣甚至有望讓機構更安心參與 DeFi ——因為他們確定代幣經過審計且可兌換,有潛力推動機構級 DeFi 發展(例如 Aave 或 Compound 流動池採用 USDC 及其他合規幣)。
3. 一般消費者與加密貨幣用戶: 對於日常使用穩定幣的人來說,這些改變在操作層面看起來不明顯,但對信任度影響重大:
- 很快你會有更多選擇「官方認可」的穩定幣,包括由你熟悉品牌(銀行或大型金融科技公司)發行的代幣。這些代幣將被宣傳為更安全、值得信賴——完全有準備資金儲備,受監管機構監督,並且有明確兌現保證。隨著透明度報告和審計成為常態,用戶對穩定幣的信心也會上升。當每一枚穩定幣兌換背後都有一美元現金且發行者每月公開資產細目時,大家對於穩定幣「爆雷」的恐懼便會大幅下降。
- 反過來說,彈性和匿名性會略微減少。 目前在某些交易場所,有些人可不需完成 KYC 就能取得境外穩定幣(如 Tether),且這類發行者也不會頻繁凍結資金。但在新制度下,所有合規穩定幣在發行和兌換時都必須完成 KYC,而且發行方有義務配合法律(如凍結涉及制裁或犯罪的資產)。事實上,像 Circle 這樣的合規發行方已數度應美國政府要求凍結地址(例如針對 Tornado Cash 相關制裁)。有了正式監管後,這種能力將更加制度化。因此,從事非法活動,甚至偏灰色地帶用途的人,會發現穩定幣受到嚴格控管——一旦地址被黑名單標記,所持代幣就可被行政凍結。對於守法使用者來說,這不成問題,反而可能是正面因素(更能防範駭客、詐騙)。但對把穩定幣當成抗審查數位現金的人而言,這一轉變可能令人失望。
- 用戶的成本與速度 預計將維持有利格局。新法並未對穩定幣交易直接徵收額外費用。若說有影響,恐反因鼓勵競爭並促進與銀行系統的整合,帶動費用下降(如銀行發行穩定幣後,部分資金移動有機會像帳戶內轉帳一樣免費)。以穩定幣進行的跨境匯款也可能快速成長,用戶享有比傳統管道更快結算與更低費率。法案基本上讓這類應用場景獲大規模合法化。
- 可近性: 越來越多主流企業或許會將穩定幣整合進自家應用程式(想像 PayPal 或 CashApp 直接內建支援合規穩定幣)。這將讓一般人不用接觸加密貨幣交易所也能輕鬆用穩定幣。過去金融科技公司因監管不明而猶豫,現在有了「USD 2.0」的綠燈,可以納入服務。需要注意的是,有些公司可能會等到 2026 年最終細節落定後,再正式推出產品。
4. 整體加密產業影響: GENIUS 法案被廣泛認為是加密產業「合法性」的重大勝利。這是美國首次以聯邦法規正向擁抱某塊加密產業,而非限制。產業支持者認為這賦予明確性,有機會吸引更多資金與用戶投入美國的加密專案。部分預期影響如下:
- 市場情緒與價格: 法案通過時,剛好伴隨幣價上揚。比特幣(通過時約 12 萬美元)、以太幣(約 3.5 千美元)因對加密友善立法刺激採用的樂觀情緒而雙雙上漲。Coinbase 股價及相關加密概念股也大幅跳升,反映投資人對監管風險減輕的信心。長線來看,明確的規範有助減少壓抑幣價的「監管 FUD」。穩定幣——這個關鍵流動性載體——獲法定承認,預計會讓加密企業在美國營運更順暢(如加密公司與銀行可順利往來,因銀行明確知道穩定幣業務已合法受監管)。這將進一步推動產業交易量與資本流入。
- 創新與新產品: 法律願景已定,開發者和公司可放心以穩定幣為基礎開發新產品,不必老是擔心突如其來的打壓。例如,去中心化金融(DeFi)協議現可放心整合合規穩定幣,並有望與合規發行方合作,創造「合規 DeFi」或傳統金融與 DeFi 的協作空間。預見會有更多嶄新金融商品(如鏈上借貸、付款網路、結算系統)皆以獲美國法律背書的穩定幣為核心。Mastercard 加密負責人曾指出穩定幣正在「關鍵轉折點」,這部新法「象徵創新新紀元」已然到來。現今,有明確法律地位,企業接受穩定幣作支付將更普遍——像電商平台或薪資穩定幣發放,因為法律與會計處理都更清楚了。
- 全球競爭地位: 美國正積極布局成為穩定幣監管領頭羊,這會影響他國政策。立法初衷在於讓美國核可的穩定幣成為全球標準,連帶輸出美國金融規範並強化美元滲透力。他國可能陸續仿效(如過去美國銀行監管經常成為標杆)。值得一提的是,歐盟近期 MiCA 規範已涵蓋穩定幣(稱為「資產掛鉤型代幣」),也對歐元錨定幣施加類似儲備和監理要求。英國也正推進將穩定幣納入支付系統。GENIUS 法案有望促使各國搶吸引發行商——但現在美國其實已建立一套具吸引力、全面性的制度,有望將項目吸引回美國本土,逆轉因監管不明導致的人才/企業外流。
5. 美國金融體系與美元政策: 除了加密產業,穩定幣監管對傳統金融體系及美國經濟政策也有下列深遠影響:
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美元主導地位與貨幣政策: 立法者公開表示這部法案旨在鞏固美元的全球角色。做法為何?以美元計價且全球廣泛流通的穩定幣,等於推進國際美元化。例如,幣值不穩的國家,民眾已大量採用 USD 穩定幣(如 USDT)來儲值。若能有受美國監管的穩定幣,作為美元替代品,信任度會更高。這將可能推升全球對美元及相關資產的需求(因為每一枚穩定幣流通,背後都對應儲備的美元或國債)。本質上,私人穩定幣可成為美國「軟實力」工具,推動美元在數位領域的使用,甚至凌駕於潛在競爭對手——like China’s digital yuan. President Trump emphasized this aspect, saying the Act puts the U.S. “lightyears ahead of China” in the crypto finance race.
像中國的數位人民幣。川普總統特別強調這一點,表示該法案讓美國在加密金融競賽上「遠遠領先中國」。 -
Demand for Treasuries: A perhaps underappreciated effect is that stablecoin reserves will largely be invested in U.S. Treasury bills, creating a new, growing class of Treasury buyers. Tether and Circle already park tens of billions in T-bills. With the Act’s blessing, stablecoin issuers (including new bank entrants) could scale up dramatically, pouring even more into short-term Treasuries. This helps finance U.S. government debt at the margin. Some analysts have speculated this was a strategic motive – if foreign governments (like China or Japan) buy fewer Treasuries, private stablecoin issuers might fill some gap by purchasing hundreds of billions in T-bills to back their coins. In effect, the U.S. could indirectly fund deficits by harnessing global demand for dollar stablecoins. However, this dynamic also comes with a caveat: if stablecoin holders en masse redeem during stress, issuers might rapidly sell Treasuries, which could pressure the Treasury market in a crisis. Regulators considered this, which is why only very short-duration T-bills (closest to cash) are allowed, and why they built in bankruptcy stays to manage an unwinding in an orderly way.
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對美國國債的需求: 也許較少受到重視的一個影響是,穩定幣的準備金將大部分投資於美國國庫券,創造出一個新且不斷壯大的國債買家族群。Tether和Circle已經將數百億美元資金配置於國庫券。有了這部法案背書,穩定幣發行方(包括新進銀行)規模可能大幅提升,把更多資金投入短期國債。這在邊際上有助於美國政府債務融資。有些分析師推測這也是戰略動機之一——若外國政府(如中國或日本)減少購買美債,私人穩定幣發行方可能會購買數千億國庫券以作為幣值背書,部分填補缺口。實際上,美國藉由全球對美元穩定幣的需求,間接為赤字提供資金。不過,此動態也有風險:若持有者在壓力時期大量贖回,發行方可能會迅速拋售國債,從而在危機時給國債市場帶來壓力。監管單位正是考慮到這點,才只允許極短天期、接近現金的國庫券作為準備資產,並設置了破產暫緩條款,以便有序處理資產變現。
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Banking System: Banks were initially wary that stablecoins could siphon off deposits. The Act addressed that by banning interest on stablecoins and by allowing banks to hold reserves (so banks keep the money anyway). Community banks, in particular, got language inserted to ensure they can use stablecoin deposits in lending and that nonbanks don’t get Federal Reserve accounts that would give them an undue advantage. As a result, the banking industry’s trade groups like ICBA moved to neutral or supportive. In the long run, banks could even benefit: they may gain new fee business as custodians or reserve holders for stablecoin issuers, and they can offer their own digital dollar products. Some analysts compare the advent of stablecoins to the money market fund revolution in the 1980s – initially seen as competition for banks, but ultimately the system adjusted with banks offering similar products. Now banks might integrate stablecoins for faster client payments or settlement between institutions (JPMorgan already uses JPM Coin for 24/7 intra-bank transfers). If banks successfully adapt, stablecoins could operate synergistically with banking, with minimal deposit outflows. However, if stablecoins do gain huge traction as a retail payment method, banks might see a gradual shift where people hold more funds in digital wallets (essentially, holding a claim on a stablecoin issuer) versus checking accounts. The no-interest rule limits this, but tech-savvy users might still prefer the flexibility of stablecoins for certain uses. The exact impact will depend on how aggressively banks participate in issuing their own vs. letting fintechs take the lead.
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銀行體系: 起初銀行對穩定幣是否會抽走存款感到戒心。法案透過禁止穩定幣支付利息以及允許銀行持有儲備金(無論如何資金仍留在銀行),來化解這些疑慮。社區型銀行尤其爭取到相關條文,確保它們可以將穩定幣存款用於放貸,且非銀行金融機構不得取得聯準會帳戶,以防不公平競爭。結果,像ICBA等銀行業團體轉而持中立甚至支持立場。長遠來看,銀行甚至可能受惠:可成為穩定幣發行人的託管銀行或儲備金行,開創新收費業務,也能發行自有數位美元產品。有分析師把穩定幣的出現比擬為1980年代貨幣市場基金革命——最初被視為對銀行的競爭,但最終銀行也推出類似產品予以調適。現在銀行或許會納入穩定幣,加速客戶支付或機構間清算(摩根大通已用JPM Coin做全天候內部轉帳)。若銀行能成功適應,穩定幣將與銀行體系形成協同效應,存款外流可望降至最低。不過,假如穩定幣在零售支付大獲成功,銀行也許會看到部分資金從支票帳戶逐步轉向數位錢包(本質上是對穩定幣發行方的權利要求)。零利率規定雖有抑制,但精通科技的用戶仍可能因彈性而青睞穩定幣。最終影響,端視銀行參與穩定幣發行的積極度和是否讓金融科技公司搶佔先機。
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Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC): Interestingly, as GENIUS Act promotes private stablecoins, it coincides with a push by Republicans to block a Federal Reserve-issued CBDC. In fact, alongside the stablecoin bill, the House passed a bill to prohibit a U.S. CBDC, reflecting concerns about government control and surveillance. The combination suggests the U.S. is choosing a path of “private-sector digital dollar” instead of a Fed digital dollar. Trump’s administration has been explicit in opposing a CBDC, framing it as a potential invasion of privacy. By empowering private stablecoins, the Act arguably makes a Fed-issued retail CBDC less necessary: if regulated stablecoins can provide the benefits of digital currency (fast, programmable payments) in a way consistent with American free-market preferences, the political appetite for a government-run digital dollar diminishes. Trump himself stated his policy is to “keep 100% of the bitcoin the U.S. government holds” rather than selling, and not pursue a CBDC, signaling alignment with the crypto community’s skepticism of CBDCs. So the future U.S. digital currency strategy appears to be stablecoins over CBDC. Other countries may take the opposite route (e.g. China with its e-CNY). It will be telling to see which model proves more influential globally. For now, the Act cements that the U.S. will rely on regulated private innovation to modernize the dollar, rather than a top-down Fedcoin approach.
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中央銀行數位貨幣(CBDC): 有趣的是,GENIUS法案推動私人穩定幣的同時,共和黨人亦積極阻擋聯準會發行CBDC。事實上,眾議院跟穩定幣法案一起通過了禁止美國CBDC的法案,反映對政府控制與監控的疑慮。這一組合顯示,美國選擇走「民間主導數位美元」而非聯準會官方數位美元路線。川普政府明確反對CBDC,認為其可能侵害隱私。通過賦予私人穩定幣權力,該法案在某種程度上削弱了官方CBDC的必要性——若受監管的穩定幣能以符合理想的美式自由市場模式,提供數位貨幣(如快速、可程式化支付)帶來的好處,則由政府主導的數位美元就少了政治吸引力。川普本人表示政策是「保留美國政府持有的所有比特幣」,不會出售,且不推CBDC,明確表達與加密社群對官方CBDC懷疑論者的同調。因此,美國數位貨幣未來策略目前明顯傾向穩定幣而非CBDC。其他國家可能採相反道路(例如中國的數位人民幣e-CNY)。何種模式最終在全球具更大影響力,有待觀察。就現階段而言,這部法案確立美國將依賴受監管的民間創新來現代化美元,而不是自上而下的官方Fedcoin方式。
GENIUS法案的利與弊
如同任何重大金融改革,GENIUS法案同時帶來顯著優勢與潛在缺點,亦引發支持及批評聲浪。以下是關於其利弊平衡的探討:
優點 / 潛在益處:
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監管明確性與合法性: 這部法案為加密產業帶來期待已久的法律明確性。穩定幣有清晰規則,業者明白何者可行、如何符合法規,可降低監管風險。有助於鼓勵創新——公司終於可以放心開發穩定幣產品,或將穩定幣納入服務,不必擔心一不小心違法。國會明文承認並規管數位資產,整體提升加密貨幣的公信力(正如一位官員所言,這是「加密資產邁出的里程碑式進展」),也可能吸引等待監管架構的機構投資者進場。簡言之,加密技術正從灰色地帶走向主流,為其長遠發展帶來正面展望。
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消費者保護與穩定性: 透過強制全額準備金、資訊公開與監督,法案可讓用戶擺脫最壞風險。不必再擔心某穩定幣會是部分準備甚至公開詐欺——每一發行之受監管穩定幣皆須高品質資產完全背書,且受銀行監管機關控管。贖回權利和破產優先清償條款更為持有人建立多重保障。這些護欄大幅降低穩定幣「脫鉤」或突然失敗的可能,有助提升整個加密市場所需的穩定性。若早有此規則,TerraUSD崩潰、甚至USDC短暫脫鉤情況或可避免或減輕。消費者以穩定幣作為價值儲存或支付工具時將更有信心。
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金融穩定與風險緩解: 這部法案回應了監管者對系統性風險的擔憂。它防止未受規管的「民間貨幣」體系蔓延,確保穩定幣不能演變為野貓銀行系統。透過明文規定安全準備資產及監管授權,大幅減少穩定幣引發金融恐慌的風險。此外,使發行者納入管控,讓監管機關可即時監測與因應外流或資產拋售等新興風險。聯邦統一標準亦避免各州條款四分五裂被套利。總之,法案將穩定幣納入金融監管體系,有助於萬一出事時控制傳染效應。
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美元競爭力: 如前述,堅實的法規架構旨在鞏固美元全球角色。美國穩定幣在明確規範下蓬勃發展,有望排擠較弱的外幣穩定幣,甚至壓制非美元選項。這有助於使全球加密市場流動性繼續以美元為錨,強化其數位時代的儲備貨幣地位。史帝爾議員等人明言,該法案將「確保美元持續主導地位」。地緣政治角度看,這是美國的一場勝利——強化美國影響力,也利於通過控管穩定幣流動來執行制裁或規範。此外,若穩定幣確能帶動國債需求,也會溫和提升美國政府的債務融資穩定(雖目前規模有限)。
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加快支付與普惠金融: 穩定幣有望讓支付速度更快、成本更低,尤其適用跨境或銀行作業時間之外。法案合法化可加速其滲透。消費者與企業可受益於近乎即時、全年無休的結算,與傳統銀行週末不營業形成對比。海外匯款可透過穩定幣幾分鐘內抵達,手續費低,惠及全球家庭。即使在國內市場,穩定幣也可推動新型普惠金融科技解決方案——如無銀行戶的人也能以手機錢包持有數位美元並參與電商、儲蓄。法案本質上可催生一波結合穩定幣之金融創新與普惠(想像用美國監管數位美元進行微支付、智能合約商業等場景)。許多支持者稱這是「釋放穩定幣潛能」推動金融科技與支付現代化的機會。
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受控環境優於「無政府狀態」: 美國選擇「監管以帶動負責任創新」的路線,而非一味禁止加密或穩定幣。在強力監督下釋放加密潛力,有望讓美國持續站在金融科技前沿。嚴格規範更使壞份子不易作亂,有助產業形象提升。投機或短命的穩定幣發行方勢必得轉型守規,否則就會退出,最終建立更健康生態圈。
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防止監管碎片化: 法案出台前,紐約等州已有自己的穩定幣/加密規定,聯邦監管單位如SEC、OCC也以矛盾方式主張管轄權。GENIUS法案建立聯邦統一底線,減少了混亂。它clarifies that the SEC and CFTC have no role in regulating pure payment stablecoins, ending turf battles and providing a single regulatory channel. This clear delineation (stablecoins = banking regulators’ domain) is beneficial for companies who otherwise faced uncertainty over whether their token might be deemed a security etc. It’s now codified as neither security nor commodity, which is a big win for clarity.
釐清了SEC和CFTC在純支付型穩定幣的監管中無角色,結束了過去的監管權爭奪,提供單一的監管管道。這種明確劃分(穩定幣=銀行監管機構的職權範圍)對於那些原本擔心自己發行的代幣是否會被認定為證券等的公司而言是一大助益。現在已清楚明文規定這類代幣既非證券也非商品,對於規範明確性來說是一項重大突破。
Cons / Potential Drawbacks:
缺點 / 潛在風險:
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Compliance Costs and Barriers to Entry: The flip side of strict regulation is that it imposes heavy compliance burdens. Smaller startups or decentralized projects may struggle to meet requirements like monthly audits, capital standards, and regulatory exams. This could stifle innovation from small players and concentrate the market in the hands of a few big, well-capitalized firms (big banks, large fintechs, established companies) that can afford compliance. Critics worry this tilts the playing field toward incumbents and reduces competition. Some innovative ideas (like algorithmic stablecoins or novel reserve models) might not get a chance under the strict 1:1 regime. In essence, creativity in stablecoin design is constrained – everyone must operate in more or less the same conservative manner. While that’s good for safety, it could limit the diversity of solutions in the market.
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合規成本與進入門檻: 嚴格監管的另一面是帶來沉重的合規負擔。規模較小的新創公司或去中心化項目,可能難以達到例行月度審計、資本標準及監管檢查等要求。這會扼殺小型創新者的活力,市場逐漸集中到少數具備雄厚資本、能負擔合規成本的大型銀行、大型金融科技或既有公司手中。批評者擔心這會讓現有主導者佔上風,減少市場競爭。一些創新想法(例如演算法穩定幣或新型儲備模式)在嚴格1:1儲備制度下可能沒機會實現。本質上,穩定幣設計的創意受到限制-大家都必須遵守大同小異、相對保守的做法。這對安全有益,但可能減少市場上多元解決方案的空間。
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Reduced Privacy and Censorship Resistance: By bringing stablecoins fully into the regulated finance system, user transactions will inevitably be more surveilled. Issuers under BSA obligations will collect user information and monitor transactions, eroding the pseudonymity that some crypto users valued. Moreover, as noted, regulators or issuers can freeze addresses suspected of illicit activity, meaning your funds could be immobilized if you unknowingly engage with a blacklisted counterparty. Privacy advocates see this as a negative – stablecoins might become yet another arm of the surveillance state, similar to bank accounts, eliminating one of the differentiators of cryptocurrency (financial privacy). The ban on a U.S. CBDC by Republicans was in part over privacy concerns, but a skeptic could note that a network of regulated stablecoins might achieve much the same oversight of flows. There is also risk of overreach or politicization – e.g., could an administration pressure issuers to freeze funds of protest groups or dissidents? With centralized control, those scenarios, while unlikely, are possible. In short, crypto’s more libertarian, decentralized ethos takes a back seat to compliance, which some in the community lament.
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隱私權減少與抗審查性降低: 將穩定幣全面納入正規金融體系,勢必會讓使用者交易受到更多監控。依《銀行保密法》(BSA)行事的發行者需收集用戶資訊並監控交易,侵蝕部分加密用戶重視的偽匿名性。此外,如前所述,監管方或發行者可凍結被懷疑涉不法的錢包地址,讓你若不慎與黑名單交易對手往來,資金可能被凍結。隱私倡議者視此為負面-穩定幣恐成另一種監控國家工具,如同銀行帳戶,消滅加密貨幣在金融隱私上的差異。共和黨曾以隱私疑慮部分反對美國CBDC,但批判者會指出,一個受監管的穩定幣網路其實可達到類似流動監控。尚存政治濫權疑慮,例如,政府部門是否會要求發行者凍結抗議團體或異見人士資金?雖不常見,但在中心化制度下仍有可能。簡言之,加密貨幣較自由主義、去中心化的精神被合規優先所稀釋,不少社群成員感嘆此事。
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Exclusion of Decentralized and Foreign Options: The Act’s approach is very dollar-centric and centralized. Decentralized stablecoins that operate via algorithms or over-collateralization (like MakerDAO’s DAI) may not fit this framework and could be pushed out of mainstream use or face legal challenges. This might hinder open-source, decentralized finance innovations in favor of corporate models. Additionally, by restricting foreign stablecoins unless their jurisdictions align, it could be seen as a form of financial protectionism. While it protects against regulatory arbitrage, it also means U.S. consumers might not have access to potentially useful foreign innovations if those countries take a different approach. For example, if a Japanese yen stablecoin or a euro stablecoin doesn’t have a U.S.-approved regime, U.S. exchanges can’t list it, limiting opportunities for diversification or arbitrage.
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排除去中心化與海外選項: 該法案採取非常以美元為中心且偏重中心化的模式。利用演算法或過度質押方式運作的去中心化穩定幣(如MakerDAO的DAI)可能無法適用此框架,進而被排除於主流之外,甚至可能面臨法律挑戰。這會限制開源、去中心化金融的創新空間,而有利於企業化模式。此外,除非海外穩定幣的監管制度與美國相符,否則不允許其在美國流通,這可被視為某種金融保護主義。雖說可防止監管套利,但也意味美國消費者若他國制度不同,將無法接觸潛在有用的海外創新產品。例如,日本日圓或歐元穩定幣若未獲美國批准,美國交易所就無法上架,投資多元化或套利的機會因此受限。
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Financial System Integration Risks: Some economists worry about the macro impact of large-scale stablecoin adoption. If stablecoins draw significant money out of bank deposits (despite no interest, some might still prefer the flexibility and tech features), banks could face funding pressures or need to adjust. A related concern is Treasure market fragility: as mentioned, if stablecoin issuers hold a big slice of T-bills and then have to liquidate in stress, that could create instability in the short-term funding markets. The Act doesn’t fully eliminate that risk; it mitigates it by high-quality assets, but a mass redemption event is still conceivable. Some critics say this introduces a new type of “stablecoin-bank” that could require Fed intervention in a crisis – for instance, might the Fed feel compelled to provide liquidity or buy assets from a failing stablecoin issuer to protect coin holders (even though not legally obliged)? This moral hazard question looms, albeit with holders not insured, it’s unclear. In any case, regulators will have to keep an eye on any systemic footprints as stablecoins grow.
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金融體系整合的風險: 一些經濟學家擔心大規模採用穩定幣,可能對宏觀經濟帶來影響。若穩定幣吸納大量資金自銀行存款流出(即使沒有利息,有些人仍偏好其彈性或科技性),銀行可能面臨資金壓力或被迫調整。另外一項潛在風險是國庫券市場的脆弱性:如前所述,若穩定幣發行者持有大量短債,遇壓力時被迫拋售,短期資金市場恐出現動盪。法案雖藉高品質資產來緩解,但無法完全杜絕大量贖回事件。一些批評者認為,這等於創造出一種新型類銀行機構,必要時可能需聯邦儲備介入—例如,萬一穩定幣發行者瀕臨失敗時,Fed會否感到有責任注入流動性或購買其資產來保護持有者?(雖法律無要求,但道德風險問題浮現)至於穩定幣持有人因非受保護資格,結果未明。總言之,監管機關仍須持續密切觀察隨穩定幣壯大產生的系統性痕跡。
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Innovation Trade-offs (Algorithmic Stablecoins): By effectively favoring only fully reserved stablecoins, the law perhaps closes the door on algorithmic stablecoins – a concept that, while fraught with failures so far, some argue could yield innovation in decentralized finance. The two-year moratorium that the House wanted (but ended up a study instead) signals skepticism toward such models. If the U.S. later outright bans or heavily restricts algorithmic stablecoins, developers might simply move those projects overseas or into grey markets. We may never know if a safer algorithmic design could exist, because regulation froze its evolution after early catastrophes like Terra. That’s the classic innovation vs. regulation dilemma: to prevent bad outcomes, we may also impede experimentation that could eventually succeed.
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創新折衝(演算法穩定幣): 法案實際偏向只允許全額儲備型穩定幣,形同關上對演算法穩定幣的大門-這種模式雖屢屢遭遇失敗,卻也有人認為具去中心化金融創新潛力。眾議院曾期望設兩年禁令(最終改為研究),顯示對這類模式的高度懷疑。未來倘若美國直接禁止或嚴重限制演算法穩定幣,開發者就可能把這些項目轉移至海外或進入灰色市場。至於是否真能設計出更安全的演算法穩定幣,也許我們永遠無法得知,因為監管在Terra等早期災難後就凍結了其演化。這正是創新與監管的永恆兩難:為免壞結果,我們同時遏止本可能終將成功的實驗。
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Enforcement Challenges in DeFi: The Act puts obligations on persons and entities, but enforcing them in the realm of decentralized protocols could be challenging. Some critics might argue that truly decentralized stablecoins or peer-to-peer transfers will evade these rules, undermining effectiveness. For example, if someone creates a stablecoin fully on-chain, without a clear legal entity, how does the law stop its use? The law can stop exchanges and custodians from handling it, but on-chain DEXs might still trade it. This could drive parts of the stablecoin activity into less regulated, more opaque channels – ironically the opposite of the goal. That said, such coins might struggle without integration into fiat gateways. It’s a cat-and-mouse game regulators will have to play, possibly with new tools (FinCEN’s “novel methods” to detect illicit crypto activity hint at blockchain analytics arms).
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DeFi領域的執法挑戰: 法案雖對特定個人與機構施加義務,但在去中心化協議(DeFi)領域落實具有高度挑戰性。有批評者會說,真正去中心化的穩定幣或點對點轉帳可以逃過這些規範,削弱監管效果。例如若有人完全在鏈上創建一款穩定幣,沒有明確法律實體,法律又如何阻止其流通?雖然能禁止交易所和保管機構處理,但鏈上DEX仍可交易,這可能使穩定幣活動轉向較不受規範、較不透明的管道—與立法初衷反而背道而馳。當然,沒有法幣出入金整合,這類幣種發展或受限。監管機關和創新者之間勢將展開貓捉老鼠的博弈,未來可能還會採用新工具(例如FinCEN正發展區塊鏈監控新手段以偵查非法加密活動)。
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Potential for Regulatory Capture or Politics: As with any regulatory regime, there is a risk that large industry players will have outsized influence on the rules (regulators might be lobbied to tailor capital or liquidity standards favorably, etc.). Also, future administrations could alter the course – e.g., a different Treasury Secretary might not be as willing to approve foreign regimes, affecting market competition. If a less crypto-friendly administration came in, they could enforce rules more stringently to hobble growth (though the law is in place, how it’s implemented can vary). There’s also an unresolved issue: what if stablecoin usage grows so much that it impacts monetary policy (e.g., changes demand for physical cash or bank reserves)? The Fed might then seek more authority to oversee or limit stablecoins – possibly requiring new legislation. So while the Act is a strong starting framework, there could be regulatory turf battles or adjustments down the line as the sector evolves.
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監管被壟斷或政治化的潛在風險: 如同任何監管體系,都存在產業巨頭對規則產生過度影響的風險(如遊說監管方訂出有利於自身的資本或流動性標準等)。未來不同政府執政,也可能影響政策路線—例如,不同的財政部長可能不願意批准外國監管體制,影響市場公平競爭。若遇上對加密較為不友好的政府,實際執法可更嚴,從而限制產業成長(法律雖在,落實手法仍可有差異)。尚有未竟議題:萬一穩定幣普及到足以影響貨幣政策時(如改變實體現鈔或銀行準備金需求)?屆時Fed可能尋求更大監督或限制穩定幣的權限-可能需要新立法。所以儘管該法案是一個有力起點,隨產業發展仍免不了會有新的監管權爭奪或調整。
Despite the potential downsides, the general sentiment after the Act’s passage is optimistic in the crypto community. The benefits of clarity, consumer confidence, and global competitiveness are viewed as outweighing the concerns, many of which can be managed with prudent rulemaking and oversight. The bipartisan support suggests most policymakers felt the trade-offs were acceptable to bring stablecoins into the fold rather than leave them unregulated.
儘管上述潛在缺點不少,法案通過後加密社群普遍呈現樂觀氣氛。明確化、提高消費者信心及增強全球競爭力,被認為優於那些可經審慎制定規則與監督來控管的憂慮。兩黨支持更顯示多數政策制定者認為這種取捨值得,將穩定幣納入監管體系總好過完全不管。
Final thoughts
最終看法
The signing of the GENIUS Act marks a historic turning point for cryptocurrency regulation in the United States. For the first time, Congress and the President have created a tailored legal framework embracing a crypto innovation – turning stablecoins from a peripheral, uncertain experiment into a recognized part of the financial system. In doing so, the U.S. has signaled that it aims to lead the world in the next phase of digital finance, using regulation not to stifle crypto but to shape it in line with national interests of stability, security, and dollar leadership.
GENIUS法案的簽署,是美國加密貨幣監管史上的重要轉捩點。這是國會與總統首度為某項加密創新量身制定法律框架-將穩定幣從一個邊緣、未定型的實驗,轉化為金融體系中正規且受承認的要素。此舉傳遞出美國將在數位金融新時代主導全球的明確訊號,而監管也不是為扼殺加密產業,而是使其符合國家穩定、安全與美元主導權的利益。
In the near term, attention now shifts to implementation. Federal regulators (Fed, OCC, FDIC, etc.) have one year to write detailed rules on everything from capital requirements to application procedures. The Treasury must outline how it will judge foreign regimes within a year as well. We can expect a flurry of public comment periods, industry lobbying, and perhaps state legislatures acting to establish their own frameworks to meet the certification standard. Companies interested in becoming issuers will likely start preparing their applications, which can be submitted as soon as one year after enactment. An interesting dynamic will be which route major players choose – some fintechs might go for an OCC national charter for uniform national operation, while others might start under a friendly state like Wyoming or New York if that’s faster. By late 2026 (the anticipated effective date), we could see the first federally approved stablecoin issuers coming online, and by 2027–28 the phase-out of unregulated coins in the U.S. market.
接下來重點將轉向實際落實。聯邦監管機構(如Fed、OCC、FDIC等)有一年時間擬定從資本規範到申請作業等各細節規則。財政部也必須在一年內說明如何認定外國監管體制。預料會出現一波公眾意見徵詢、業界遊說,甚至部分州政府可能搶先建立自身的認證制度標準。有意成為發行者的公司應會開始著手準備申請,最快在法案生效一年後即可提出。屆時主要市場參與者選擇哪條路徑也值得觀察-部分金融科技公司可能直接取得OCC頒發的全國執照以全美統一經營,另一些則可能優先在如懷俄明州、紐約州等合適州份建立業務以節省時間。預計2026年底(預計生效日)首波聯邦認證穩定幣發行者可望上線,至2027至2028年,美國市場上的未受規範穩定幣將正式退出。
Internationally, other countries will watch closely. The reciprocal arrangements clause means countries with similar rules might sign agreements with the U.S. – for example, perhaps the U.K. or Singapore will establish formal comity so that a stablecoin licensed there can be sold in the U.S., and vice versa. This could lead to a network of like-minded jurisdictions setting common standards (a bit like how banking standards are harmonized via Basel accords). Countries that opt
國際上,其他國家將密切觀察美國動向。互惠條款意味著具有類似監管規範的國家有機會和美國簽署協議—例如,英國或新加坡或可建立正式互認機制,讓其核准的穩定幣能在美國銷售,反之亦然。這有望促成志同道合法域間共同標準的國際網絡(有點像銀行業透過巴塞爾協定標準化監管)。倘若有國家選擇……not to regulate stablecoins may find their providers locked out of the U.S., which could pressure them to adopt compatible rules if they want to participate in this global dollar stablecoin system.
未對穩定幣進行監管的國家,可能會發現其提供商被排除在美國市場之外,這將迫使他們若想參與這個全球性的美元穩定幣體系,就必須採用相容的規則。
For the crypto industry, the Act’s success could pave the way for further positive legislation. Notably, alongside GENIUS, the House also passed the CLARITY Act, which aims to clarify the distinction between digital assets as securities vs. commodities, addressing the wider crypto market structure. That bill was heading to the Senate next. The stablecoin law’s bipartisan support bodes well for tackling these other issues – if Congress can agree on stablecoins, there’s hope they might eventually agree on broader crypto classifications and perhaps rules for exchanges. We might be witnessing the beginning of a comprehensive U.S. crypto regulatory regime that provides clear paths for the entire digital asset sector. Industry advocates call this outcome a “defining moment in the evolution of U.S. digital asset policy”.
對於加密產業來說,該法案的成功通過可能為更多正向立法鋪路。值得注意的是,眾議院除了通過GENIUS法案,同時還通過了CLARITY法案,這項法案旨在釐清數位資產是證券還是商品的界線,進一步處理更廣泛的加密市場結構。該法案接下來會送往參議院。穩定幣法案獲得兩黨支持,對於解決這些其他議題是個好兆頭——如果國會能在穩定幣上達成共識,那麼他們最終可能也能就更廣泛的加密資產分類,以及甚至交易所的規則達成共識。我們或許正見證著一套美國全面加密監管體系的開端,為整個數位資產行業提供明確的合規路徑。業界支持者稱這項成果是「美國數位資產政策發展的關鍵時刻」。
Looking further ahead, the integration of stablecoins into everyday finance could accelerate. Use cases that were speculative before might become routine: paying overseas contractors in stablecoins, settling stock trades or securities transactions with instant stablecoin payment, Internet of Things devices executing micropayments via stablecoins, and more. Because the law allows stablecoin infrastructure to plug into banking (banks can issue and use them), we might see a gradual convergence of traditional finance and crypto. For example, a person might not even know they are using a stablecoin under the hood – their banking app could simply offer instant transfers that are actually happening via tokenized dollars on a ledger. The line between “crypto money” and “real money” could blur as regulated stablecoins essentially are real money in digital wrapper.
展望未來,穩定幣融入日常金融的腳步可能會加快。過去還帶有試驗性的使用情境,有可能會變成日常操作,例如以穩定幣支付海外承包商、用穩定幣即時結算股票或證券交易、物聯網裝置透過穩定幣執行微支付等等。由於新法允許穩定幣基礎設施直接接入銀行體系(銀行可以發行與使用穩定幣),我們可能將見證傳統金融與加密的逐步融合。例如,普通用戶甚至不會意識到自己在背後使用了穩定幣——銀行App可能僅僅呈現出即時轉帳功能,但實際是透過帳本上的代幣化美元進行結算。「加密貨幣」和「真實貨幣」的界線將趨於模糊,受到監管的穩定幣本質上就是以數位形式包裝的真實貨幣。
Of course, challenges will arise. Regulators must remain vigilant to ensure compliance and update rules as needed. The crypto industry must uphold the standards – any major failure of a regulated stablecoin would be a setback for trust. Bad actors might try to exploit loopholes or new technologies to create unregulated substitutes (for instance, could a DAO issue a stablecoin algorithmically in a way that skirts the definition of “payment stablecoin”? These edge cases will need addressing).
當然,挑戰也勢必出現。監管機關必須保持警覺,確保合規並根據情況調整相關規則。加密產業也必須維持標準——任何受監管的穩定幣發生重大失敗,對信任都將是一次重大打擊。不良分子可能會試圖利用漏洞或新技術創造未受監管的替代品(例如,一個DAO是否能用演算法發行穩定幣,從而規避「支付穩定幣」的定義?這些邊緣案例都亟需被討論並解決)。
One emerging topic is central bank digital currencies vs. stablecoins. With the U.S. seemingly entrusting stablecoins to serve the role of a digital dollar, other central banks might question if they should do the same or push ahead with official CBDCs. The Anti-CBDC sentiment in the U.S. sets it apart from, say, Europe or China. Over time, if U.S. regulated stablecoins flourish and accomplish many objectives of a CBDC (fast payments, inclusion) without the government directly issuing, it might influence other democracies to favor private-sector solutions too. Alternatively, if private coins show limitations, the pressure for a Fed CBDC could return in the future. For now, the U.S. has bet on the private approach, and many will be watching the outcome.
其中一個新興話題是央行數位貨幣(CBDC)與穩定幣的競合。美國似乎將「數位美元」這一角色交由穩定幣扮演,其它央行會不會也跟進,還是會推動官方版CBDC,成為討論焦點。美國社會排斥CBDC的氛圍,也讓它與歐洲、中國等地截然不同。隨著時間推移,如果美國受監管的穩定幣蓬勃發展、成功達成CBDC的許多目標(例如快速支付、普惠金融)而無須政府直接發行,此舉也可能影響其他民主國家更傾向於市場導向的解決方案。反之,若私人穩定幣曝光出重大限制,推動聯準會發行CBDC的呼聲未來或會再起。目前,美國已選擇了民間路線,全球各界都在密切觀察其成果。
In conclusion, the GENIUS Act represents a comprehensive, good-faith effort to bring order to the stablecoin realm. Its passage demonstrates that U.S. lawmakers can craft thoughtful cryptocurrency legislation that balances innovation with safeguards – a stark contrast to the enforcement-only approach of prior years. The Act is expected to spur growth in the crypto economy by unlocking new opportunities for investment and technology, while also extending the safeguards of the traditional financial system into the digital currency world. As President Trump described at the signing, supporters believe “this could be perhaps the greatest revolution in financial technology since the birth of the internet itself”. That may be hyperbole, but there’s no doubt the stablecoin law opens an important new chapter. If implemented well, the GENIUS Act will likely be remembered as the moment the U.S. embraced the tokenization of money – melding the trust of the old financial system with the transformative power of blockchain technology, to the benefit of consumers and the competitiveness of the U.S. economy in the 21st century.
總結來說,GENIUS法案是一份全面且誠意十足的努力,旨在為穩定幣市場帶來秩序。它的通過展現出美國國會可以制定兼顧創新與保障的加密貨幣立法,這與過去單純依靠執法的做法形成鮮明對比。預計該法案將透過開放新型投資與科技機會,推動加密經濟成長,同時也將傳統金融體系的保障延伸到數位貨幣世界。正如川普總統在簽署時所說,支持者認為「這或許將會是自網際網路誕生以來,金融科技領域最偉大的革命」。或許這有些言過其實,但無可否認,穩定幣立法確實開啟了一個重要新篇章。如果執行得當,GENIUS法案極有可能被視為美國擁抱貨幣代幣化的歷史時刻——將舊有金融體系的信任,與區塊鏈技術的變革力量融合,最終造福消費者並提升美國在21世紀的經濟競爭力。

